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Abstract
The Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication (CPPA) protocol has applica-
tions in the construction of secure Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) due to
its capability to achieve both privacy preservation and authentication simultane-
ously. Although a number of CPPA protocols have been proposed in the literature,
existing approaches generally suffer from limitations such as the security problem
of system private keys, high computation requirement during certificate gener-
ation and message verification phases. To resolve these issues, this thesis firstly
presents a Certificateless and Provably-Secure Conditional Privacy-Preserving
Authentication (CPS-CPPA) protocol for VANETs based on the Tamper-Proof De-
vice (TPD). To improve efficiency further, the proposed CPS-CPPA scheme added
the function of batch verification. However, this thesis has found out that the
CPS-CPPA protocol cannot guarantee the secrecy of one master key in practice
and not withstand the forged message attack and impersonation attack. To over-
come the vulnerabilities of CPS-CPPA protocol, this thesis presents an Enhanced,
Certificateless and Provably-Secure Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentica-
tion (ECPS-CPPA) protocol to be used in vehicular environments that supports
both privacy and security requirements in the VANETs system. This thesis also
demonstrates that the ECPS-CPPA protocol is secure against forged message at-
tack, impersonation attack, and other existing attacks. A comparative summary
shows that our ECPS-CPPA protocol has favorable computation and communica-
tion overheads in comparison to the other two recently published protocols. In
the future, it is important to implement a proof of concept of this protocol in order
to evaluate the real-world utility of ECPS-CPPA protocol.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we introduce an overview about CPPA protocols for Vehicular
Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) in Section 1.1, as well as the contributions and orga-
nization of the thesis in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 respectively.
1.1 Overview
Due to constant and rapid advancements in the development of wireless com-
munication and network technologies, VANETs have regained renewed interest
due to their capability to support vehicles with wireless devices to communicate
with other vehicles and Roadside Units (RSUs) and ensure traffic safety and en-
hance driving efficiency [1–8]. Other benefits associated with VANETs include
collision avoidance, lane merging, traffic optimization, toll collection, location-
based services, infotainment, etc [9]. In the literature, such settings have also been
considered Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and smart cities [10, 11].
One can think of VANETs as a combination of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)
with vehicles (e.g. cars, buses, trucks and motorcycles) and RSUs [3,12,13]. Unlike
nodes in a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), vehicles are not usually resource
constrained in terms of power, storage space and computing capability. A typical
Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) includes Trusted Authorities (TAs) (e.g. traf-
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Figure 1.1: A typical structure of VANETs
fic authority centers), RSUs (e.g. placed on road sides or other installations), and
Onboard Units (OBUs) equipped on vehicles [3, 14, 15] – see Figure 1.1.
Communications in VANETs, such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I), use Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), which is
a short medium range communications protocol [14]. Every vehicle could com-
municate with adjacent vehicles and the nearby RSUs located at the roadside
through the Onboard Unit (OBU) installed in the vehicle and DSRC protocol. For
example, on-vehicle OBUs periodically broadcast traffic-related information cov-
ering factors such as position, weather conditions, direction, speed, and traffic
situation. Such information allow participating vehicles in the vicinity to take
the required actions, for example take an alternate route to avoid a traffic acci-
dent, traffic congestion, etc [16, 17]. RSUs and other vehicles can also transmit
traffic-related information (e.g. an accident that has just taken place) to the traffic
administration department or other relevant department (e.g. law enforcement or
fire department), so that the necessary actions can be undertaken [18]. Hence, it is
not surprising that VANETs and the many variants (e.g. IoV, Intelligent Transport
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Systems (ITS), and smart cities) have received recent attention [9].
Similar to other wireless networks, there are a number of other features important
to VANETs, such as the following:
Security: Once attackers have controlled over the communication channels, they
could easily eavesdrop, tamper, replay or even drop messages sent within VANETs.
In other words, designers of VANETs need to ensure the system is secure against
a wide range of attacks such as masquerading, replaying, tunneling, message
modification, key and certificate replication attacks [9, 14, 18]. For example, an
malicious adversary may hijack and modify the initial messages or masquerade
one legitimate vehicle to broadcast ‘fake’ messages, resulting in chaos or traffic
incidents [18]. Hence, the capability to ensure the authenticity of messages from
vehicles in VANETs is crucial.
Anonymity: If the vehicle user sends his/her identity to RSUs or other vehicles
without masking, a malicious attacker may track the user’s routes through captur-
ing of the messages. The leakage of routes may have real-world consequences such
as physical stalking, kidnapping, and assassination (e.g. a malicious adversary
intercept and replace intercepted messages with fabricated messages in order to
reroute the victim’s vehicles). Therefore, anonymity is another key feature in
VANETs [19].
Traceability (and conditional privacy): If a misbehaving vehicle transmits malicious or
suspicious information to RSUs or nearby vehicles, then the system needs to have
the ability to identify the vehicle (and the owner) so that the vehicle (and the owner)
can be taken to task (e.g. monetary penalties or other criminal sanctions). Thus,
both traceability and conditional privacy are important features [18]. Conditional
privacy restricts to the Trusted Authority (TA) being the only party who can extract
the vehicle’s real identity.
CPPA schemes such as those presented in [3, 9, 12, 18–25] can be used to achieve
both security and privacy related properties within VANETs. There are, however,
limitations in these existing schemes as discussed in Section 3.1.
3
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, it introduces two efficient, provably-secure and anonymous CPPA
solutions for VANETs in order to overcome limitations in existing CPPA schemes.
To be specific, four main contributions of our work are described as below.
• First, the vulnerabilities of existing schemes are retrospected and analyzed.
Meantime, several security weaknesses of these schemes are pointed out. Then,
it demonstrates several previously unknown flaws in the protocols of Azees et
al. [20] and Zhang et al. [26], respectively.
• Second, this thesis presents a CPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs [27]. To improve
efficiency further, the proposed CPS-CPPA scheme added the function of batch
verification.
• Third, this thesis points out that the CPS-CPPA protocol cannot guarantee the
secrecy of one master key in practice and not withstand the forged message attack
and impersonation attack. To overcome the weaknesses of the CPS-CPPA protocol,
this thesis presents an ECPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs.
• Finally, we also conducted a comparison of the computation overhead and
communication overhead to prove that our ECPS-CPPA scheme possesses more
favorable performance compared with existing solutions for VANETs.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides the overview,
contributions and organization. Chapter 2 shows the background and design
goals for VANETs. Chapter 3 reviews the existing studies, and especially revis-
its and analyzes Azees et al.’s protocol and Zhang et al.’s protocol respectively.
Chapter 4 presents a CPS-CPPA protocol [27]. Chapter 5 points out the weak-
nesses in the CPS-CPPA protocol in Chapter 4, and then presents an ECPS-CPPA
protocol. Chapter 6 summarizes the computation and communication overheads
comparison. At last, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
4
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we introduce some preliminaries about CPPA protocols for VANETs.
In particular, Section 2.1 introduces the network model and preliminaries about
cryptography that used in this thesis. In Section 2.2 we list the design goals
according to the existing literature.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Network Model
As shown in Figure 2.1, the two-level network model is pretty adaptable for
VANETs, in which the TA is set as the first-level, and RSUs as well as vehicles
are set as the second level, respectively. The functions of these three entities are
described as below.
TA : TA is fully trusted by all parties of VANETs and has sufficient computation,
communication and storage capabilities. The TA is also responsible for the genera-
tion of system parameters and the registration of RSUs and vehicles. In addition,
upon successful completion of their registration, the TA initially generates the
security parameters for all vehicles and RSUs, and stores them into the vehicles
and RSUs offline. It is capable of recovering the genuine Identity (ID) of vehicle
5
Figure 2.1: The network model of VANETs
from the transmitted message.
RSUs : RSUs are stationary infrastructures deployed on the roadside or some
installations (e.g. bus stops). RSUs serve as the ‘interface’ between the TA and
vehicles, and utilizes the DSRC [28] protocol for V2V and V2I wireless commu-
nications. It could authenticate traffic messages from vehicles and process them
locally or forward them to TA. In our solution, RSUs are semi-trusted. If an RSU
was compromised, then TA could detect and either reset the compromised RSU or
remove/replace it.
Vehicle : Every vehicle is equipped with an OBU, which allows the vehicle to com-
municate wirelessly with other vehicles and RSUs using the DSRC protocol. Every
OBU may have a Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) to protect stored secret information,
e.g. secret keys etc.
2.1.2 Preliminaries about cryptography
Here, we will review three key cryptographic primitives, namely: bilinear pairings,
Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem, and Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem [29].
Let e : G1 × G2 → G3 be a rational function, where G1, G2, G3 are three groups
with a large prime order q. Let g1 and g2 respectively denote the generators of G1
6
and G2. e is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the below three properties:
• Bilinearity: For elements g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and v, w ∈ Z∗q , e(gv1 , gw2 ) =
e(g1, g2)
vw holds.
• Nondegeneracy: e(gv1 , gw2 ) 6= 1G3 .
• Computability: For any two elements V ∈ G1, W ∈ G2, we can compute
e(V,W ) efficiently; that is, there is a valid algorithm to compute easily e :
G1 ×G2 → G3.
In addition, it is known that there is no polynomial-time or efficient algorithm to
resolve the below two hard problems.
• DL Problem: For an element y ∈ G1 (or y′ ∈ G2), the DL challenge is to be
able to compute x ∈ Z∗q such that y = gx1 (or y′ = gx2 ) holds.
• CDH Problem: For two elements ga1 , gb1 ∈ G1 (or ga2 , gb2 ∈ G2) with two
unknown elements a, b ∈ Z∗q , the CDH problem is to compute ga·b1 ∈ G1 (or
ga·b2 ∈ G2).
2.2 Design Goals
Based on the literature [16, 18–20, 23, 24, 27, 30–43], a secure and efficient CPPA
solution for VANETs is supposed to satisfy the following requirements or goals.
Identity Privacy Preservation: RSUs, vehicles and third-party participants are not
capable of extracting the vehicle’s actual identity from the messages transmitted
from any vehicle.
Message Authentication and Integrity: Every message transmitted by a vehicle
should be authenticated by the receivers such as RSUs and other vehicles, and
the receivers are capable of detecting any modification or fabrication of received
messages.
Traceability: The TA is the only entity capable of extracting the vehicle’s actual ID
when the need arises (e.g. a complaint against a misbehaving vehicle).
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Unlinkability: RSUs, vehicles and third-party participants are not capable of
tracing the vehicle’s behavior by analyzing its transmitted messages. That is, they
cannot link and decide if two messages are transmitted from the identical vehicle.
Secrecy of Master Key: Although every vehicle or RSU is installed with a TPD,
the highly-motivated attacker can extract the data memorized in the device by
power analysis techniques [44]. Therefore, it is very essential to preserve the
master key of VANETs system safely.
Resilient to Message Modification Attack: The adversary may transmit modified
information around the VANETs system in order to achieve his/her specific goal.
For example, an adversary would transmit fake/modified traffic information to
his/her nearby vehicles for the sake of obtaining an optimal traffic route. Therefore,
the modified messages are not supposed to pass the verification by the receivers
(e.g. other vehicles and RSUs)
Resilient to Impersonation Attack: Such attacks are generally targeted at other
legal vehicles. They are executed by sending fake messages to other vehicles in
which the adversary attempts to masquerade as a trusted vehicle.
Resilient to Replay Attack: The replay attack is a form of network attack in which
the transmitted information is fraudulently or maliciously delayed or repeated.
Thus, the secure VANETs system should withstand such attack.
Full Batch Verification: It is not efficient for the receiver to authenticate the au-
thenticity of received messages one by one, therefore, full batch verification is
a necessary property in which the receiver could verify the legality of multiple
messages from vehicles simultaneously.
No Map-to-Point Operation: It is expensive and complicated to execute the map-
to-point operation, and consequently, it will degrade the performance of the
VANETs system. Therefore, map-to-point operation is supposed to be avoided in
a CPPA scheme for VANETs.
No Certificates Management: The overhead and complexity of certificates man-
agement increase with the number of registered vehicles. Besides, it is important to
authenticate the legality of certificate prior to accept. To guarantee better feasibility
8
and performance of vehicular system, it is capable of supporting no certificates
management in the design of a CPPA scheme.
No Verifier Table: To avoid governance issue and attacks relating to verifier table,
a CPPA protocol for VANETs must be capable of supporting no verifier table.
Provable Security: The security of cryptographic protocol is supposed to be
proved via a widely acknowledged security model [45]. In another word, without
the preciseness of a security proof, the customers would not be sure of the security
of the cryptographic system. Therefore, a CPPA scheme is supposed to be proved
securely under a security model.
9

Chapter 3
Existing Studies
In this chapter, Section 3.1 reviews the existing studies on CPPA protocols. Specifi-
cally, to vividly understand the weaknesses in the existing CPPA protocols, we
choose two typical CPPA protocols [20, 26] to revisit and analyze. Section 3.2
reviews and analyzes the CPPA protocol of Azees et al. [20]. In Section 3.3, we
revisit and demonstrate the insecurity of Zhang et al’ CPPA protocol [26]. Finally,
the summary is presented in Section 3.4.
3.1 State of the Art
This section briefly reviews existing literature on CPPA schemes designed for
VANETs.
In 2006, Gamage et al. [21] introduced an ID-based ring signature solution to
ensure privacy for VANETs applications. However, the presented approach does
not provide traceability and this implies a lack of conditional privacy. A year later
in 2007, Raya et al. [9] introduced a CPPA solution using anonymous certificates.
Specifically, to mask the vehicle’s real identity, a large number of key pairs and
corresponding certificates based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) are preloaded
into the memory space of vehicles’ OBUs and the OBU randomly chooses a pair
of private/public key that can be used for authentication. This imposes storage
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requirements for each vehicle (e.g. to store its private/public key pairs and corre-
sponding certificates), and TA (e.g. to store all vehicles’ certificates). For a large
system with vehicles constantly joining and leaving, it is not a trivial task to search
for and identify a misbehaving vehicle in practice. In 2008, a new CPPA solution
using bilinear pairing is designed by Lu et al. [23]. In this solution, the RSU sends
a temporary anonymous certificate to the vehicle which passes by the region of the
RSU. The RSUs also provide the vehicles a fresh anonymous certificate periodi-
cally to enforce conditional privacy. Nevertheless, this solution has a low efficiency.
In the same year, Lin et al. [46] provided a privacy-preserving protocol utilizing
group signature technique, which provides traceability. However, in Lin et al.’s
solution, each vehicle has to store the revocation list to avoid communicating with
the ‘blacklisted’ vehicles. Therefore, as the number of revoked vehicles increases,
the checker will need to spend considerably amount of time on the verification
stage alone. This is clearly not practical.
In 2008, Zhang et al. [25] constructed an ID-based batch authentication protocol
based on pairing-based cryptography. In their approach, both vehicles and RSUs
do not need to store any certificate. Moreover, their solution provides batch
verification for multiple messages. In other words, this CPPA solution overcomes
the limitation in the approaches of Raya et al. [9] and Lu et al. [23]. Nevertheless, in
the approach of Zhang et al. [25], a long-term system master secret s is embedded
in the vehicle’s TPD, which could be extracted by an adversary (e.g. via side-
channel attacks [47]), particularly when the adversary has physical access to the
TPD.
In 2009, Jiang et al. [22] presented an authentication protocol based on the binary
authentication tree (BAT), in which the RSU could quickly differentiate the fabri-
cated messages from the legitimate ones. However, Shim [12] demonstrated that
an adversary can successfully forge an aggregate signature on two bogus messages
in the scheme of Jiang et al. [22]. Shim [3] also introduced a CPPA solution using
Pseudo-Identity (PID)-based signature for secure VANETs. Liu et al. [48], however,
revealed that Shim’s solution in [3] has an error in the batch verification stage.
In 2013, Li and Liu introduced a lightweight identity authentication scheme for
VANETs to improve the efficiency of the authentication process while concealing
12
the sensitive information of the vehicle simultaneously [49]. Then, Lee and Lai
proposed a secure batch verification protocol with group testing for VANETs [50].
In 2015, He et al. [18] proposed an ID-based CPPA solution for VANETs utiliz-
ing Schnorr’s signature [51]. In He et al.’s solution, the system’s private key is
preloaded on the vehicle’s TPD. In other words, the proposed solution suffers
from the same limitation as the solution of Zhang et al. [25]. In 2016, Oulhaci
et al. also designed a secure and distributed certification system framework for
security message authentication in VANETs, which is against fake public-key cer-
tification [52]. In the same year, Lee et al. use the Chinese remainder theorem to
design a safer and quicker batch key-agreement protocol for establishing commu-
nication channels [53]. More recently in 2016 and 2017, Shao et al. [19] and Azees
et al. [20] introduced a group signature-based CPPA solution for VANETs and an
authentication solution based on short-time anonymous certificates and public
keys, respectively. The proposed solution of Azees et al. [20] does not support
batch verification. In addition, the adversary against Azees et al.’s protocol cannot
resist bogus message attack, framing attack and sybil attack. The reason of suf-
fering from the above attacks is because the authors use a temporarily generated
number as the private key to sign traffic message, which is a invalid signature
and easily counterfeited by adversary. In 2017, Zhang et al. [26] gave a new dis-
tributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication protocol for vehicular ad
hoc networks. In their protocol, one RSU is responsible for a subgroup of VANETs
and holds a private key used to produce secret shares for vehicles. Although, they
give some assumptions guaranteeing that no other items can learn the secrets in
a vehicle’s TPD, if a vehicle is corrupted in one RSU, the private key of the RSU
would be calculated by the malicious adversary. Later, Zhang et al. gives a novel
method to establish cryptographic mix-zones which resist malicious attackers and
reinforce privacy protection in VANETs [54]. In 2018, Asaar et al. proposed a
novel ID-based message authentication protocol via proxy vehicles (ID-MAP) [55],
which cannot preserve the security of master key either.
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3.2 Review and Analysis of Azees et al.’s CPPA
Protocol
3.2.1 Azees et al.’s CPPA Protocol: A Revisit
We will now briefly review Azees et al.’s CPPA protocol [20]. The protocol has
two anonymous authentication procedures, namely, the authentication scheme
for the vehicle and the authentication scheme for the RSU. The anonymous
authentication procedure for an RSU is similar to that for a vehicle; thus, we
will only review the authentication procedure for a vehicle. This procedure has
six sub-stages, namely, system initialization stage, vehicle registration and key
generation stage, anonymous certificate generation of vehicle, vehicle signature
generation, verification stage, and traceability stage.
System Initialization: Using the bilinear parameters (G1, G2, G3, e, q), the TA com-
putes the system parameters as shown below. TA chooses two random numbers
a, b ∈ Z∗q as the master keys, generates A1 = ga1 and B1 = gb1, and chooses a cryp-
tographic hash function h¯ : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . Finally, TA sets the system parameters
param = (q, e, g1, g2, G1, G2, G3, A1, B1, H) public.
Vehicle Registration and Key Generation: In the registration stage, the vehicle
needs to provide relevant user information, such as name, license plate number,
address, and contact number to the TA. In the key generation stage, TA obtains the
vehicle user ui’s original identity OIDui . Then, TA computes dummy identities
DIDui for ui. To compute ui’s dummy identity, the TA selects a nonce ni ∈ Z∗q
and computes DIDui = g
ni+a
1 . Then, the TA chooses a nonce vi ∈ Z∗q , generates
Ti = g
1
vi+a+b
1 and stores (OIDui , DIDui , T
b
i ) corresponding to ui in the database of
the tracking list. The TA returns the authorization key AK = (DIDui , Ti, Ei) to
ui in an offline manner (e.g. a smart card), where Ei = g−ni1 . Upon receiving AK
from the TA, ui stores it in the vehicle’s TPD.
Anonymous Certificate Generation of Vehicle: Once ui participates in the sys-
tem, ui generates the anonymous certificates using AK as shown below.
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• ui chooses a range of random numbers r1, r2, · · · , rl ∈ Z∗n, l ≤ n and com-
putes Yk = grk2 for k = 1, 2, · · · , l.
• ui randomly chooses µ, k1, k2 ∈ Z∗q and computes γu = Bµ1 , γv = Ti · Aµ1 ,
λ = (µ+ rk) mod q, λ1 = γµ+k1u , λ2 =
γ
µ+k1
u
γ
µ+k2
v
. After computing γu, γv, λ, λ1, λ2,
ui computes the challenger c = h¯(DIDui ||A1||B1||Ei||γu||γv||Yk||λ1||λ2), σ1 =
(rk − k1) mod q, and σ2 = (rk − k2) mod q.
• Finally, the user generates Certk = {Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||a||σ1||σ2} as the
anonymous certificate.
Remark-1: The product of Ei and DIDui for every vehicle user is con-
stant, namely, Ei × DIDui = g−ni1 × gni+a1 = ga1 = A1 and A1 (as
well as B1) is a public parameter generated in the system initialization
stage. The generations of parameters {Yk, λ1, λ2, γu, γv, λ, σ1, σ2, c, Certk} are
based on the randomly selected numbers {rk, µ, k1, k2} ∈ Z∗q , whereby the
challenger c = h¯(DIDui ||A1||B1||Ei||γu||γv||Yk||λ1||λ2), and Certk is the set
of {Yk||Ei||DIDui||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}. Thus, a malicious adversary A can
also randomly choose new {rA, µ′, k′1, k′2} ∈ Z∗q and produce fabricated
{YA, λ′1, λ′2, γ′u, γ′v, λ′, σ′1, σ′2, cA, CertA}.
Vehicle Signature Generation: To verify the integrity of message M , ui generates
the signature sig = g
1
rk+h¯(M)
1 and transmits msg = (M ||sig||Yk||Certk) to nearby
vehicles and RSUs.
Remark-2: The authors only use the ephemeral value rk to sign the message,
where rk is also used in the challenger c and certificate Certk. Thus, A can easily
fabricate sigA = g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , where MA is the message that A wishes to broadcast
and rA is the one used in Remark 1.
Verification: Upon receiving msg = (M ||sig||Yk||Certk), the receiver will verify
the challenger c and the integrity of message in the following steps.
1. The receiver computes
Ni = Ei ×DIDui = g−ni1 × gni+a1 = ga1 = A1,
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λ′1 =
γλu
γσ1u
=
γµ+rku
γrk−k1u
= γµ+rk−rk+k1u = γ
µ+k1
u = λ1,
λ′2 =
γλu · γσ2v
γσ1u · γλv
=
γµ+rku · γrk−k2v
γrk−k1u · γµ+rkv
=
γµ+rk−rk+k1u
γµ+rk−rk+k2v
=
γµ+k1u
γµ+k2v
= λ2.
Then, the challenger computes c = h¯(DIDui||Ni||B1||Ei||γu||γv||Yk||λ′1||λ′2)
and inspects if c is equal to c′. If the verification is successful, then the
receiver verifies the sender and accepts {Yk||Certk}; otherwise, the receiver
interrupts the session.
2. The receiver authenticates the integrity of traffic message by checking the
correctness of e(sig, Yk · gh¯(M)2 ) = e(g1, g2). Note that e(sig, Yk · gh¯(M)2 ) =
e(g
1
rk+h¯(M)
1 , g
rk
2 · gh¯(M)2 ) = e(g
1
rk+h¯(M)
1 , g
rk+h¯(M)
2 ) = e(g1, g2)
1
rk+h¯(M)
·rk+h¯(M) =
e(g1, g2). Therefore, the receiver accepts msg.
Remark-3: Although all the equations are correct and {A1, λ1, λ2} can be re-
vealed by a simple computation, the verification is weak since the parameters
{Yk, λ1, λ2, γu, γv, λ, σ1, σ2, c, Certk} are produced based on randomly selected num-
bers, and thus, there is no reliable public parameter used in the verification that is
generated by the TA and one that cannot be fabricated by A. In other words, A
can also produce these parameters and successfully pass the required verification
(see Section 3.2.2).
Traceability: Once a malicious vehicle transmits a fabricated or modified mes-
sage to mislead others, the TA can utilize its anonymous certificate Certk =
{Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2} to compute the value as follows.
γbv
γau
=
(Ti · Aµ1)b
(Bµ1 )
a
=
T bi · (Aµ1)b
(Bµ1 a)
=
T bi · gaµb1
gµab1
= T bi
Thus, the TA will know the vehicle’s identity by matching the value T bi in the track-
ing list and proceed to remove the malicious vehicle from the network/system.
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3.2.2 Security Flaws
According to Remarks 1-3 in the preceding section (see Section 3.2.1), we will
now explain how the protocol is not secure against the four attacks described in
Sections 3.2.2.1 to 3.2.2.3 as below.
3.2.2.1 Bogus Message Attack
A can transmit a fabricated message by the following steps.
1. A captures a signed message msg = (M ||sig||Yi||Certi) sent by some vehicle
user ui, where Certi = {Yi||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2} is the anonymous
certificate of ui and {DIDui , Ei} will be used in step 2. Then, A randomly
chooses a number rA and computes YA = grA2 , where g2 is the generator of
group G2.
2. For the corresponding short time certificate CertA, A randomly chooses
γu′ , γv′ , µ′, k′1, k′2 ∈ Z∗q and computes λ′ = (µ′ + rA) mod q,
λ′1 = γu′
µ′+k′1 and λ′2 =
γu′
µ′+k′1
γv′
µ′+k′2
. Then, A generates the forged chal-
lenger cA = h¯(DIDui ||A1||B1||Ei||γu′ ||γv′||YA||λ′1||λ′2), σ′1 = (rA − k′1),
σ′2 = (rA − k′2) as well as the corresponding certificate CertA =
{YA||Ei||DIDui ||γ′u||γ′v||cA||λ′||σ′1||σ′2}, whereby {DIDui , Ei} are involved in
the captured Certi = {Yi||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}.
Remark-1’: As discussed in Remark-1, since the generations
of parameters {Yk, λ1, λ2, γu, γv, λ, σ1, σ2, c, Certk} are based on
the randomly selected numbers {rk, µ, k1, k2} ∈ Z∗q , where the
challenger c = h¯(DIDui ||A1||B1||Ei||γu||γv||Yk||λ1||λ2), and Certk
is the set of {Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}, A can also ran-
domly choose new {rA, µ′, k′1, k′2} ∈ Z∗q and produce fabricated
{YA, λ′1, λ′2, γ′u, γ′v, λ′, σ′1, σ′2, cA, CertA}. Additionally, since the genera-
tion of γu = B
µ
1 and γv = Ti ·Aµ1 are both based on µ and there is no detection
on γu and γv in the stage of verification, A only needs to choose random γu′
and γv′ instead of computing them by µ′, which decreases the computation
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cost.
3. A forges a message MA, generates the corresponding signature sigA =
g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , and then sends the message msgA = (MA||sigA||YA||CertA) to
nearby RSUs or vehicles.
Remark-2’: As discussed in Remark-2, A can successfully fabricate sigA =
g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , where MA is the message that A wishes to broadcast and rA is the
one selected in step 1.
4. After receivingmsgA = (MA||sigA||YA||CertA) fromA, the receiver computes
Ni = Ei ×DIDui = A1,
λ′′1 =
γλ
′
u′
γσ1u′
=
γµ
′+rA
u′
γ
rA−k′1
u′
= γ
µ′+rA−rA+k′1
u′ = γ
µ′+k′1
u′ = λ
′
1,
λ′′2 =
γλ
′
u′ · γσ
′
2
v′
γ
σ′1
u′ · γλ′v′
=
γµ
′+rA
u′ · γrA−k
′
2
v′
γ
rA−k′1
u′ · γµ
′+rA
v′
=
γ
µ′+rA−rA+k′1
u′
γµ
′+rA−rA+k2
v′
=
γ
µ′+k′1
u′
γµ
′+k2
v′
= λ′2.
Then, the challenger computes c′A = h¯(DIDui ||Ni||B1||Ei||γu′||γv′ ||YA||λ′′1||λ′′2);
thus, it is trivial to note that c′A = cA.
5. Finally, the receiver authenticates the integrity of traffic message by
checking the correctness of e(sig, YA · gh¯(MA)2 ) = e(g1, g2). Clearly,
e(sig, YA · gh¯(MA)2 ) = e(g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , g
rA
2 · gh¯(MA)2 ) = e(g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , g
rA+h¯(MA)
2 ) =
e(g1, g2)
1
rA+h¯(MA)
·rA+h¯(MA) = e(g1, g2). Hence, the receiver accepts the forged
message msgA.
Remark-3’: As discussed in Remark-3, since the equations required for
the recovery (i.e., Ni = A1, λ′1 = λ1, and λ′2 = λ2) and verification
(i.e., cA and e(sig, YA · gh¯(MA)2 ) = e(g1, g2)) are correct and the parame-
ters {Yk, λ1, λ2, γu, γv, λ, σ1, σ2, c, Certk} are produced based on randomly
selected numbers, A’s fabricated {YA, λ′1, λ′2, γ′u, γ′v, λ′, σ′1, σ′2, cA, CertA} can
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also successfully pass all verification steps.
6. If the TA determines that MA is a forged message, it will recover the IDui
by computing
γb
v′
γa
u′
. However, the latter is a nonce, and hence, it is not use-
ful. Therefore, this protocol does not provide message authentication or
traceability.
3.2.2.2 Framing Attack
1. A executes step 1 in Section 3.2.2.1, computes λ1 = γλuγσ1u ,
λ2 =
γλu ·γσ2v
γ
σ1
u ·γλv and generates the forged challenger cA =
h¯(DIDui ||A1||B1||Ei||γu||γv||YA||λ1||λ2), as well as the corresponding
certificate CertA = {YA||Ei||DIDui||γu||γv||cA||λ||σ1||σ2}.
2. A forges MA, generates a corresponding signature sigA = g
1
rA+h¯(MA)
1 , and
sends msgA = (MA||sigA||YA||CertA) to nearby RSUs or vehicles.
3. After receiving msgA = (MA||sigA||YA||CertA) from A, the verification of
{cA||YA||CertA} will show that it is valid, since there is no detection pro-
cedure for the modification on Yi and A does not modify ui’s parameters
{Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||λ||σ1||σ2}. Then, the receiver will verify the integrity of
the message by checking the correctness of e(sig.YA · gh¯(MA)2 ) = e(g1, g2).
4. If the TA later determines that MA is forged, it will recover the identity IDui
by computing γ
b
v
γau
= T bi to be the identity for the originator of the forged
message. However, ui is not the true attacker, and hence, ui has been the
victim of a framing attack.
Remark-4’: The difference between the framing attack and bogus message at-
tack lies in the choice of (γu, γv). If A uses (γu, γv) in the captured message
Certi = {Yi||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2} of vehicle user ui and broadcasts mali-
cious information, then the TA would recover the adversary as the innocent ui. If
A uses the pair of randomly selected (γu′ , γv′), then no user will be detected (see
step 6 in Section 3.2.2.1).
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3.2.2.3 Sybil Attack and Replay Attack
As described in Sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2, it is possible for A to carry out a Sybil
attack against the Azees et al.’s protocol [20]. In addition, the protocol is not
resilient to the replay attack because the protocol does not detect and guarantee
message freshness. Since the replayed messages could successfully pass the
verification procedure, Sybil attacks with a replay attack can be carried out and
this can result in real consequences.
3.2.2.4 Lack of batch authentication stage
Although the authors in [20] evaluated the computational cost in the batch authen-
tication of multiple messages, it is only a single message verification. We observe
that the protocol lacks a specific and efficient batch authentication process, and the
importance of the batch authentication in secure communication is also explained
in [56].
3.3 Review and Analysis of Zhang et al.’s CPPA
Protocol
3.3.1 Zhang et al.’s CPPA Protocol: A Revisit
There are mainly five phases in Zhang et al.’s CPPA protocol [26], which are
described as follows.
3.3.1.1 System Setup
In this phase, the root trusted authority (TA) executes the below steps to initialize
the system parameters.
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1. The root TA generates a bilinear map: eˆ : G1 × G2 → G3, where G1, G2, G3
are cyclic groups with prime order q, g1 and g2 are generators of G1 and G2
separately.
2. The root TA picks a, b ∈ Z∗q as its master secrets, and computes y = ga2 , e = gb1
as its master public keys. a is utilized to launch certificates for RSUs and b is
utilized to set up a secure channel between TA and an RSU or a vehicle
3. The root TA selects Epi(.)/Dpi(.) and hash functions H0(·) : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H1(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2key(·) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l, H3(·) : {0, 1}∗ → Γ and
H4(·) : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l′ , where H2key(·) is a keyed hash, the key space of key
is {0, 1}∗, and Γ is the key space of pi. Selects Λ from the key space of key.
4. The root TA keeps a, b,Λ secretly and preloads Params =
{eˆ, q, G1, G2, G3, g1, g2, H0(·), H1(·), H2key(·), H3(·), Epi(.)/Dpi(.)}.
3.3.1.2 RSU Setup
In this phase, every roadside unit (RSU)Rj’s private-public key pair and certificate
are generated.
1. Rj picks aj, bj ∈ Z∗q and computes yj = gaj2 , ej = gbj1 , whereby (aj, bj) are Rj’s
private keys and (yj, ej) are Rj’s public keys. aj is responsible for producing
shares for the vehicles, and bj is responsible for establishing a secure channel
between Rj and a vehicle.
2. Rj submits (yj, ej) and its identifying information (e.g. Rj’s validity period
of its public key and location information ) to the root TA by a secure chan-
nel. TA issues the short-term certificate CertRj = (IDRj , (yj, ej), Sigj) to Rj ,
where Sigj is a signature on (IDRj , (yj, ej)). CertRj is broadcast within Rj’s
communication range.
3.3.1.3 Vehicle Setup
The vehicle Vi is supposed to be initialized before joining a VANET.
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1. The root TA computes Vi’s PID PIDVi = H2Λ(IDVi ||V Pi) and selects an
authentication key λi, where IDVi is Vi’s genuine identity and V Pi is the
validity period.
2. TA stores the {Params, PIDVi , λi} into Vi’s TPD and adds
{IDVi , V PI , P IDVi , λi} to member list ML.
3.3.1.4 Member Secrets Generation
In this phase, a vehicle will obtain the member secrets from its nearest RSU as
following steps.
1. Vi firstly verifies the validity of CertRj from Rj . If Sigj in CertRj is not
valid under the master public key y, it terminates; elsewise, Vi extracts the
identity IDRj and the public keys (yj, ej) from CertRj . Vi selects a random
value θ ∈ Z∗q , computes f = gθ1, pii1 = H3(f, ej, eθj , IDRj , Tt), and pii2 =
H3(f, e, e
θ, IDRj , Tt), where Tt is the current time-stamp. Vi computes %j =
Ei2(λi, Tt) and transmits (f, IDRj , %j, Tt) to Rj .
2. After receiving (f, IDRj , %j, Tt) form Vi, Rj firstly checks whether Tt is fresh
or not. If Tt is fresh, Rj forwards (f, IDRj , %j, Tt) to TA via a secure channel,
elsewise, it terminates.
3. Upon receiving (f, IDRj , %j, Tt) from Rj , TA computes pii2 =
H3(f, e, f
b, IDRj , Tt) and Dpii2(%j) = (λ
′
i, T
′
i ). If λ′i does not exist in the
tuple {IDVi , V PI , P IDVi , λi} of ML like λi 6= λ′i or Tt 6= T ′t or V Pi is expired,
it terminates; elsewise, it issues 1 to Rj via the secure channel.
4. Once receiving 1 from TA, Rj computes pii1 = H3(f, ej, f bj , IDRj , Tt) and
selects an authorized period Tp and two member secrets (αj, βj) satisfying
aj = αj · βj . Then, it continues computing h¯Rj = H2pii1 (Tp, αj, βj) and %′ =
Epii1(Tp, αj, βj, h¯Rj) and broadcasts (H4(f), %
′
j).
5. Upon receiving (H4(f), %′j), Vi computes Dpii1(%
′
j) = (Tp, αj, βj, h¯Rj) and then
authenticates if h¯Rj = H2pii1 (Tp, αj, βj). If it is correct, it sets the member
secrets and the authorized period in the TPD to be (αj, βj) and Tp; elsewise,
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it terminates.
3.3.1.5 Vehicle Signature
1. Vi generates a public pseudo-identity PPIDi,t = H4(PIDVi , Tt), where
PIDVi is its pseudo-identity and Tt is the time-stamp.
2. Vi computes pidi,t,0 = H0(PPIDi,t, 0), pidi,t,1 = H0(PPIDi,t, 1), s′i,t,0 = pid
αj
i,t,0,
si,t,0 = s
′βj
i,t,0, s
′
i,t,1 = pid
αj
i,t,1, si,t,1 = s
′βj
i,t,1, sets si,t = (si,t,0, si,t,1) as the one-time
signature key of Vi.
3. Vi computes σi,t = si,t,0shii,t,1 as the signature, where hi =
H1(Mi, PPIDi,t, CertRj), and broadcast (Mi, PPIDi,t, σi,t).
4. Finally, to make the member secrets stored in the TPD update locally [57],
choose a random r ∈ Z∗q , sets αj = rαj and βj = r−1βj and set (αj = α′j ,
βj = β
′
j) as the new secret values.
3.3.1.6 Batch Message Verification
Upon receiving multiple messages {m1, PPIDi,j1 , σ1}, {m2, PPIDi,j2 , σ2}, . . .,
{mn, PPIDi,jn , σn} sent by vehicles of the same/neighboring groups, the veri-
fier verify the validity of those messages via the below steps.
1. The verifier divides the public pseudo-identities into l sets S1 =
{PPID1,j1 , . . . , PPIDt1,jt1}, S2 = {PPIDt1+1,jt1+1 , · · · , PPIDt2,jt2}, . . ., S1 =
{PPIDtl−1+1,jtl−1+1 , · · · , PPIDn,jn}.
2. The verifier computes the aggregate signature Ω = Πni=1σi.
3. The verifier computes hi = H1(Mi, PPIDi,t, certRk), pidi,0 = H0(PPIDi,ji , 0)
and pidi,1 = H0(PPIDi,ji , 1) for PPIDi,ji ∈ Sk.
4. The verifier checks whether eˆ(Ω, g2) =
∏l
j=1 eˆ(
∏
i∈S′j idi,0id
hi
i,1, yj). If it is
correct, outputs 1; elsewise outputs 0.
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3.3.2 Security Flaws
In this subsection, we will propose three vulnerabilities against Zhang et al.’s
solution, which are presented as below.
3.3.2.1 Leakage of RSU’s private key
Assuming the adversaryA has registered a vehicle inRj with {Params, PIDVi , λi}
stored in its TPD. According to step 5 of 3.3.1.4, after receiving (Tp, αj, βj, h¯Rj)
successfully, A could compute Rj’s the private key aj = αj · βj , which is based on
the step 4 of 3.3.1.4.
3.3.2.2 Forged Message Attack
An attacker A can transmit a forged message by the following steps.
1. A chooses a random number as PPIDi,t and two new member secrets
(αj, βj), where r is random value, αj = rαj and βj = r−1βj .
2. A computes pidi,t,0 = H0(PPIDi,t, 0), pidi,t,1 = H0(PPIDi,t, 1), s′i,t,0 =
pidi,t,0
αj , si,t,0 = s′i,t,0
βj , s′i,t,1 = pidi,t,1
αj , si,t,1 = s′i,t,1
βj , sets si,t = (si,t,0, si,t,1)
as the one-time signature key of A.
3. A computes σi,t = si,t,0 · si,t,1hi as the signature, where hi =
H1(MA, PPIDi,t, CertRj), and broadcast (MA, PPIDi,t, σi,t).
4. Upon receiving the message (MA, PPIDi,t, σi,t), the verifier finds out A’s
corresponding CertRj and computes hi = H1(MA, PPIDi,t, CertRj), pidi,0 =
H0(PPIDi,t, 0) and pidi,1 = H0(PPIDi,t, 1).
5. The verifier checks whether eˆ(σi,t, g2) = eˆ(pidi,0 · pidi,1hi , yj). We can verify
the correctness as below.
eˆ(σi,t, g2) =eˆ(si,t,0 · si,t,1hi , g2)
=eˆ(s′i,t,0
βj · s′i,t,1
βj ·hi
, g2)
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=eˆ(pidi,t,0
αj ·βj · pidi,t,1αj ·βj ·hi , g2)
=eˆ(pidi,t,0
aj · pidi,t,1aj ·hi , g2)
=eˆ(pidi,t,0 · pidi,t,1hi , gaj2 )
=eˆ(pidi,t,0 · pidi,t,1hi , yj)
3.3.2.3 Impersonation Attack
A can forge a message with one intercepted user’s pseudo-identity PPIDi,t
through the following steps.
1. A intercepts the transmitted message {Mi, PPIDi,j, σi} and sets PPIDi,t =
PPIDi,j .
2. A extracts the Tt from Mi, which is used to forge a new message MA, and
then executes the other steps as those in 5.2.2.
3. If the TA later detects that MA is a fake message, it will find out the real
identity IDVi by checking whether PPIDi,t = H4(PIDVi , Tt), where PIDVi
is in the tuple {IDVi , V PI , P IDVi , λi} on ML. Hence, the adversary A could
mount the framing attack on the honest Vi.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the existing studies on CPPA protocols. In particular,
we studied the anonymous CPPA protocols of Azees et al. [20] and Zhang et al [26].
designed for VANETs, respectively. We revealed previously unknown attacks
against them, and more importantly identified design flaws in their protocol.
Specifically, in Azees et al.’s protocol, randomly-selected numbers are used to
produce all other parameters without binding these numbers to an identity. In
addition, there is no reliable public verification. Hence, an attacker can easily
exploit these design flaws to carry the four attacks we showed in this chapter.
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Zhang et al.’s protocol is not against the attacks from malicious adversary, since
the RSU sends its private signature key aj to vehicles with an easy variation.
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Chapter 4
CPS-CPPA: Certificateless and
Provably-Secure Conditional Privacy-
Preserving Authentication Protocol
4.1 Motivation
To resolve the vulnerabilities of existing schemes that are retrospected and ana-
lyzed, especially, the flaws in the protocols of Azees et al. [20] and Zhang et al. [26].
This chapter presents a CPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs with the function of batch
verification [27].
4.2 The CPS-CPPA Protocol
The proposed CPS-CPPA protocol [27] consists of two parts, namely: an anony-
mous CPS-CPPA solution for the vehicle and an ID-based CPS-CPPA solution for
the RSU. For each part, there are five stages, i.e., system parameters setup stage,
enrollment stage, message signing stage, single message verification, and batch
messages verification.
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Table 4.1: The working flow of anonymous CPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle
Stages TA Vehicle Vi RSUj
System TA selects two master keys a, b ∈ Z∗q
Initialization TA computes Apub = ga and Bpub = gb as public keys
TA generates and broadcasts system parameters
Params = {q,G, g,Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3}
Vehicle
Enrollment
TA
{IDi}, offline←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Vi
TA selects random numbers {ki,1, · · · , ki,z} ∈ Z∗q
TA computes PKi,l = gki,l , l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes PIDi,l = IDi ⊕H0(PKbi,l, Bpub), l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes ski,l = a ·H1(PIDi,l), l ∈ {1, · · · , z}.
TA
{Params,PID∗i ,SK∗i ,PK∗i }, offline−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Vi
Vi stores {Params, PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i } into its TPD
Signature Vi selects PIDi,l, ski,l, PKi,l
Generation Vi randomly chooses ri ∈ Z∗q
Vi computes Ri = gri
Vi generates the current timestamp Ti
Vi computes hi = H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q
Vi generates the signature Sigi = (H3(Ri)− ski,l · hi) · r−1i
Vi
Msgs={Mi,PIDi,l,PKi,l,Ri,Ti,Sigi}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
Single RSUj checks whether Ti is fresh
Authentication RSUj computes H1(PIDi,l) ∈ Z∗q
RSUj computes hi = H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q
RSUj checks if R
Sigi
i ·AH1(PIDi,l)·hipub = gH3(Ri) holds
Batch Vehicles
Msgs1,Msgs2,··· ,Msgsn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
Authentication RSUj checks whether {T1, T2, · · · , Tn} are fresh
RSUj computes H1(PIDi,l) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , n
RSUj computes hi = H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , n
RSUj checks if g
∑n
i=1(%i·H3(Ri)) =
∏n
i=1R
%i·Sigi
i ·A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
pub
Traceability TA receives reported Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}
TA computes IDi = PIDi,l ⊕H1(PKbi,l, Bpub)
4.2.1 Anonymous CPS-CPPA Protocol for Vehicle
The details of proposed CPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle [27] are described as below,
and the working flow is also illustrated in Table 4.1.
System Parameters Setup: Prior to the arrangement of VANETs, TA generates the
system parameters Params as follows:
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1. Given a security parameter k ∈ Z+, TA generates a prime q and a group G of
the order q, where g is a generator of G. TA also chooses five cryptographic
hash functions H0 : G × G → {0, 1}∗, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ ×G×G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , H3 : G→ Z∗q and H4 : G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q ,.
2. TA selects a random number a ∈ Z∗q and sets Apub = ga, where a is a master
secret key for private key extraction and is only known to TA. Similarly, TA
chooses a random number b ∈ Z∗q and sets Bpub = gb, where b is a master
secret key for traceability and is only known to TA.
3. Finally, TA publishes system parameters Params =
{q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3, H4}.
Enrollment for Vehicle: Utilizing the Pseudo-Identities (PIDs) that are uniquely
associated with the corresponding real identities allows us to achieve anonymous
conditional privacy-preserving authentication in our solution.
1. A legitimate vehicle Vi transmits information including its unique identity
IDi (e.g. the vehicle user’s personal identity, vehicle’s license plate number
etc.) to TA. Upon confirming the validity of IDi, TA selects a group of private
random numbers {ki,1, ki,2, · · · , ki,z} ∈ Z∗q and computes the corresponding
public values PK∗i = {PKi,1, PKi,2, · · · , PKi,z}, where PKi,l = gki,l and
l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
2. TA generates a group of PIDs for Vi as PID∗i = {PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z},
where PIDi,l = IDi ⊕H0(PKbi,l, Bpub) and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}. Hence, the real
identity IDi of vehicle Vi is masked in the pseudo-IDs PID∗i .
3. After computing the PID∗i , TA computes private keys SK∗i =
{ski,1, ski,2, · · · , ski,z}, where ski,l = a ·H1(PIDi,l) and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
4. Finally, TA sends system parameters Params and z triple sets of
{PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i } to vehicle Vi via a secure channel delivering a TPD for Vi.
It is assumed that the adversary A cannot extract any information from the
vehicle’s TPD, even if A has registered one vehicle.
Vehicle Message Signing: In order to guarantee message authentication and in-
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tegrity, each message issued by a vehicle should be signed and verified before
it is accepted by the RSUs or other vehicles. The signature on one traffic-related
message Mi by Vi is explained as follows.
1. Vi randomly selects a private key ski,l, a corresponding PKi,l and
pseudo-identity PIDi,l from the sets SK∗i , PK∗i and PID∗i separately.
Then, Vi chooses a random ri ∈ Z∗q and computes Ri = gri , hi =
H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q , Sigi = (H3(Ri) − ski,l · hi) · r−1i , where
the generation of Sigi is based on [58], and Ti is the current timestamp that
supports the freshness of a valid signed message.
2. Then, Vi issues the signature messageMsgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}
to a nearby RSU.
Single Message Verification: Once the receiver (i.e. RSU or other vehicles) has
received a single message signed by Vi, RSU will authenticate the message in
order to ensure that the sender is a legitimate user rather than an adversary
impersonating some legitimate user.
1. After receiving Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} signed by Vi, the re-
ceiver checks the freshness of timestamp Ti. The verifier drops the message
if it is not fresh.
2. If Ti is valid, the receiver then computes H1(PIDi,l), hi =
H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q and verifies whether RSigii · AH1(PIDi,l)·hipub =
gH3(Ri). If the equation is satisfied, then the receiver accepts the validity of
the message Mi; otherwise, the receiver rejects it.
Batch Messages Verification: When there are a large number of vehicles in the
communication range of the receiver, single message authentication may result
in higher computation overhead due to verification delay. Therefore, this paper
also presents a batch verification method so that the receiver can efficiently verify
multiple messages at the same time. This will significantly decrease verification
delay. In addition, the small exponent test technology [48, 59, 60] is adopted
in the batch messages verification in order to guarantee the non-repudiation
of signatures. Upon receiving n messages {M1, P ID1,l, PK1,l, R1, T1, Sig1},
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{M2, P ID2,l, PK2,l, R2, T2, Sig2}, · · · , {Mn, P IDn,l, PKn,l, Rn, Tn, Sign} simultane-
ously, the receiver uses Params = {q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3, H4} to au-
thenticate batch messages, as below.
1. The receiver checks the freshness of {T1, T2, · · · , Tn}, and rejects the messages
that are not fresh.
2. The receiver randomly selects n numbers {%1, %2, · · · , %n}, where %i ∈R [1, 2m]
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and m = 80 is typically adequate [48, 59, 60].
3. The receiver computes H1(PIDi,l), hi = H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q for
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and checks whether the below verification equation holds.
g
∑n
i=1(%i·H3(Ri)) =
n∏
i=1
R%i·Sigii · A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
pub .
If it is equal, then the receiver accepts the messages; otherwise, the receiver
rejects the messages.
The correctness of the batch messages verification is demonstrated as below:∏n
i=1R
%i·Sigi
i · A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
pub
=
∏n
i=1(R
%i·Sigi
i · A%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hipub )
=
∏n
i=1((g
ri)%i·(H3(Ri)−ski,l·hi)·r
−1
i · (ga)%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
=
∏n
i=1(g
ri·%i·(H3(Ri)−(a·H1(PIDi,l))·hi)·r−1i · ga·%i·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
=
∏n
i=1(g
ri·r−1i ·%i·(H3(Ri)−(a·H1(PIDi,l))·hi) · g%i·a·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
=
∏n
i=1(g
%i·H3(Ri)−%i·a·H1(PIDi,l)·hi · g%i·a·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
=
∏n
i=1(g
%i·H3(Ri)−%i·a·H1(PIDi,l)·hi·+%i·a·H1(PIDi,l)·hi)
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·H3(Ri)
= g
∑n
i=1(%i·H3(Ri))
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Table 4.2: The working flow of ID-based CPS-CPPA protocol for RSU
Stages TA Vehicle Vi RSUj
RSU
Enrollment
TA
{IDrsuj }, offline←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RSUj
TA selects random numbers {xj,1, · · · , xj,z} ∈ Z∗q
TA computes Yj,l = gxj,l , l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes rskj,l = a ·H4(Yj,l, RIDj), l ∈ {1, · · · , z}.
TA
{Params,RIDj ,RSK∗j ,Y ∗j }, offline−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
RSUj stores {Params,RIDj , RSK∗j , Y ∗j } into its TPD
Signature RSUj selects rskj,l, Yj,l
Generation RSUj randomly chooses wj ∈ Z∗q
RSUj computes Wj = gwj
RSUj generates the current timestamp Tj
RSUj computes rhj = H2(Mj , RIDj , Yj,l,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q
RSUj generates Rsigj = (H3(Wj)−RSKj,l · rhj) · w−1j
Vi
Msgs={Mj ,RIDj ,Yj,l,Wj ,Tj ,Rsigj}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RSUj
Single Vi checks whether Tj is fresh
Authentication Vi computes rhj = H2(Mj , RIDj , Yj,l,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q ,
Vi computes H1(Yj,l, RIDj) ∈ Z∗q
Vi checks if W
Rsigj
j ·AH4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhjpub = gH3(Wj) holds
Batch Vi
Msgs1,Msgs2,··· ,Msgst←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RSUj
Authentication Vi checks whether {T1, T2, · · · , Tt} are fresh
Vi computes rhj = H2(Mj , RIDj , Yj,l,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , t
Vi computes H4(Yj,l, RIDj) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , t
Vi checks if
∏t
j=1W
ςj ·Sigj
j ·A
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
pub = g
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H3(Wj))
4.2.2 ID-based CPS-CPPA Protocol for RSU
The RSUs are supposed to present their real identities when sending signed mes-
sages, since they belong to the infrastructure and are not subject to the privacy
issue. The details of the proposed CPS-CPPA protocol for RSU [27] are shown as
follows (see also Table 4.2). The system parameters setup stage in ID-based CPPA
solution for RSU is the same as those described in 4.2.1; thus, this section omits
this stage in the discussion that follows.
Enrollment for RSU: TA generates a unique identity RIDj for each RSU, which
includes its corresponding location information. Then, TA computes private keys
for RSU as follows.
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1. For a given RSU’s identity RIDj , TA selects a group of private random
numbers {xj,1, xj,2, · · · , xj,z} ∈ Z∗q and computes the corresponding public
values Y ∗j = {Yj,1, Yj,2, · · · , Yj,z}, where Yj,l = gxj,l and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
2. TA computes private keys RSK∗j = {RSKj,1, RSKj,2, · · · , RSKj,z}, where
RSKj,l = a ·H4(Yj,l, RIDj) and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
3. Finally, TA sends Params and {RIDj, RSK∗j , Y ∗j } to RSU via a secure chan-
nel. Then, RSU stores its private key {RSK∗j , Y ∗j } with its corresponding
identity RIDj into its storage memory.
RSU Message Signing: In the event when an RSU broadcasts location-based traf-
fic information to nearby vehicles, the signature upon traffic messageMj generated
by the RSU is as follows:
1. RSU chooses a private key RSKj,l from the set RSK∗j , a corresponding
Yj,l from the set Y ∗j , a random wj ∈ Z∗q and computes Wj = gwj , rhj =
H2(Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj) ∈ Z∗q , and Rsigj = (H3(Wj) − RSKj,l · rhj) · w−1j ,
whereby Tj is the current timestamp which supports the freshness of a valid
signed message.
2. Then, RSU broadcasts the signature message Msgs =
{Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj, Rsigj} to nearby vehicles.
Single Message Verification: When a vehicle Vi receives single message signed by
an RSU, Vi will have to authenticate the message in order to ensure the legitimacy
of RSU.
1. After receiving Msgs = {Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj, Rsigj} signed by the RSU, Vi
checks the freshness of timestamp Tj and drops the message if Tj is not fresh.
2. If Tj is valid, then Vi computes rhj = H2(Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj) ∈ Z∗q ,
H4(Yj,l, RIDj) and verifies whether W
Rsigj
j · AH4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhjpub = gH3(Wj). If
the equation is satisfied, then Vi accepts the validity of the message Mj ;
otherwise, Vi rejects it.
Batch Messages Verification: To handle the situation when a vehicle receives
multiple signed messages from RSUs in a time interval, a batch verifica-
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tion method is also presented. This allows the vehicle to efficiently verify
multiple messages from vehicles at the same time. Specifically, after receiv-
ing t messages {M1, RID1, Y1,l,W1, T1, Rsig1}, {M2, RID2, Y2,l,W2, T2, Rsig2}, · · · ,
{Mt, RIDt, Yt,l,Wt, Tt, Rsigt} simultaneously, the vehicle verifies them using the
below steps.
1. The vehicle checks the freshness of {T1, T2, · · · , Tt}, and rejects the messages
if some of them are not fresh.
2. The vehicle randomly selects t numbers {ς1, ς2, · · · , ςt}, where ςj ∈R [1, 2m]
for j = 1, 2, · · · , t and m = 80 is typically adequate [48, 59, 60].
3. The vehicle computes rhj = H2(Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj) ∈ Z∗q , H4(Yj,l, RIDj)
for j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t} and checks whether the below verification equation
holds.
t∏
j=1
W
ςj ·Rsigj
j · A
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
pub = g
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H3(Wj)).
If it is equal, then the vehicle accepts the messages; otherwise, the vehicle
rejects the messages.
The correctness of the batch messages verification is demonstrated, as fol-
lows.∏t
j=1W
ςj ·Rsigj
j · A
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
pub
=
∏t
j=1(W
ςj ·Rsigi
j · Aςj ·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhjpub )
=
∏t
j=1((g
wj)ςj ·(H3(Wj)−ski,l·rhj)·w
−1
j · (ga)ςj ·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
=
∏t
j=1(g
wj ·ςj ·(H3(Wj)−(a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj))·rhj)·w−1j · ga·ςj ·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
=
∏t
j=1(g
wj ·w−1j ·ςj ·(H3(Wj)−(a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj))·rhj) · gςj ·a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
=
∏t
j=1(g
ςj ·H3(Wj)−ςj ·a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj · gςj ·a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
=
∏t
j=1(g
ςj ·H3(Wj)−ςj ·a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj ·+ςj ·a·H4(Yj,l,RIDj)·rhj)
=
∏t
j=1 g
ςj ·H3(Wj)
= g
∑t
j=1(ςj ·H3(Wj))
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4.3 Security Proofs
In this section, it will demonstrate that the presented anonymous CPS-CPPA
protocol for vehicle achieves the security and privacy requirements outlined in
Section 2.2 [27]. We does not give further analysis on the ID-based CPPA protocol
for RSU, since the process of proof and analysis is similar to that of the presented
anonymous CPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle as below.
4.3.1 Security Model
The definition of security for our proposed solution is given by a game executed be-
tween a polynomial-time adversary A and a challenger I. In the game, Amounts
a number of oracle queries to I as follows, which can be requested adaptively.
Setup: This query simulates the initialization of the VANETs system. When
receiving this query, I creates the master keys and Params, and returns Params
to A.
Hi: After A sends the query with the information I , I selects a random number
pii ∈ Z∗q , stores (I, pii) in the list LHi and returns pii to A, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
GenerateV ehicle: Upon receiving the vehicle Vi’s identity IDi, I produces
Vi’s pseudo-identities PID∗i , private keys SK∗i , public values PK∗i and stores
{IDi, P ID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i } in the list Lvehicle.
CorruptV ehicle: Upon receiving the vehicle Vi’s identity IDi, I transmits
{PID∗i , SK∗i } to A.
Signature: Upon receivingA’s message M and pseudo-identity PIDi, I generates
and returns the corresponding signature message Msgs to A.
Upon executing the aforementioned queries, A fabricates a signature Sig∗i of a
traffic message M∗i associated with V ∗i ’s identity ID∗i .
Awins the above experiment if all the below conditions are fulfilled.
1) Sig∗i is legitimate, namely: V erification(M∗, V ∗i , ID∗i , Sig∗i ) = 1.
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2) A has not executed a CorruptV ehicle query associated with V ∗i ’s identity ID∗i .
3) A has not executed a Signature query associated with V ∗i ’s pseudo-identity
PID∗i and message M∗i .
Let the function AdvCPS−CPPAΩ1,A denote the advantage of A in breaking conditional
privacy-preserving authentication of the presented CPS-CPPA solution Ω1.
Definition 1. The proposed CPS-CPPA solution Ω1 is chosen-identity and chosen-
message secure, if for any polynomial-time adversary A, the function AdvCPS−CPPAΩ1,A
is negligible.
4.3.2 Provable Security
Based on Definition 1, the chosen-identity and chosen-message security of the
CPS-CPPA solution using random oracles are proved.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the underlying DL problem is intractable, the CPS-CPPA
solution for VANETs is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that a polynomial-time adversary A could fabricate a valid sig-
nature message Msgs = {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} by a non-negligible advan-
tage ε, then the challenger I can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible
advantage through executing the A as a subroutine. Let Apub = ga be an in-
stance of the DL problem, and the aim of the I is to compute a. First, I issues
Params = {q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3} toA, andA performs random oracle
queries adaptively simulated by I as below.
H0 Oracle: I maintains a list LH0 in the form of {Θ, Bpub, pi0}, which is empty
initially. When A issues a query {Θ, Bpub} to I, I checks whether the tuple
{Θ, Bpub, pi0} is in the list LH0 . If so, I issues pi0 = H0(Θ, Bpub) to A, otherwise,
I selects a random nonce pi0 ∈ Zp, issues pi0 = H0(Θ, Bpub) to A and appends
{Θ, Bpub, pi0} to the list LH0 .
H1 Oracle: I maintains a list LH1 in the form of {Υ, pi1}, which is empty initially.
When A issues a query Υ to I, I checks whether the tuple {Υ, pi1} is in the list
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LH1 . If so, I issues pi1 = H1(Υ) to A, otherwise, I selects a random nonce pi1 ∈ Zp,
issues pi1 = H1(Υ) to A and appends {Υ, pi1} to the list LH1 .
H2 Oracle: I maintains a list LH2 in the form of {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, pi2}, which
is empty initially. When A issues a query {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti} to I, I checks
whether the tuple {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, pi2} is in the list LH2 . If so, I issues pi2 =
H2(Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti) toA, otherwise, I selects a random nonce pi2 ∈ Zp, issues
pi2 = H2(Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti) toA and appends {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, pi2} to the
list LH2 .
H3 Oracle: I maintains a list LH3 in the form of {Ri, pi3}, which is empty initially.
When A issues a query {Ri} to I, I checks whether the tuple {Ri, pi3} is in the list
LH2 . If so, I issues pi3 = H3(Ri) to A, otherwise, I selects a random nonce pi3 ∈ Zp,
issues pi3 = H3(Ri) to A and appends {Ri, pi3} to the list LH3 .
GenerateVehicle Oracle: I maintains a list Lvehicle in the form of
{IDi, ki, PKi, P IDi, SKi}which is empty initially. Once A sends this query to I,
A checks whether the tuple {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi} is in the list Lvehicle. If so, I
returns PKi to A; otherwise I executes the steps as below.
1) If IDi = ID∗i , I selects three random numbers ki, pi0 and pi1, computes PKi =
gki and holds {PIDi, SKi}. I stores {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi}, {Θ, Bpub, pi0}
and {Υ, pi1} in the lists Lvehicle, LH0 and LH1 respectively. At last, I returns
PKi to A.
2) If IDi 6= ID∗i , I selects three random numbers ki, pi0 and pi1, computes
PKi = g
ki , PIDi = IDi ⊕ pi0, SKi = a · pi1. I stores {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi},
{Θ, Bpub, pi0} and {Υ, pi1} in the lists Lvehicle, LH0 and LH1 respectively and
finally returns PKi to A.
CorruptVehicle Oracle: A cannot mount this inquiry in Ω1, because we assume
that the adversary A cannot extract any information from the vehicle’s TPD, even
if A has registered one vehicle.
Signature Oracle: Upon receiving A’s query with message Mi and pseudo-
identity PIDi, I selects two random numbers ri, pi2, pi3 and computes Ri = gri
and Sigi = (pi3 − SKi · pi2) · r−1i . I stores {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, pi2} to the
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list LH2 , {Ri, pi3} to the list LH3 and returns the signature message Msgs =
{Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to A.
Finally, A outputs a signature message {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to I with
PIDi. If PIDi 6= PID∗i , then I aborts the game. I checks whether the below
equation is correct.
RSigii · AH1(PIDi)·hipub = gH3(Ri) (4.1)
If it is not correct, then I interrupts the game. Based on the forking lemma in [61],
if the challenger repeats the procedure with a different selection H2, then A can
output another legitimate signature message {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sig′i}with the
advantage ε′ ≥ 1
9
. Thus, the following equation is obtained:
R
Sig′i
i · AH1(PIDi)·h
′
i
pub = g
H3(Ri) (4.2)
According to the above two equations, the following equations are obtained:
R
Sigi−Sig′i
i = A
H1(PIDi)·(h′i−hi)
pub (4.3)
R
Sigi·h′i−Sig′ihi
i = g
H3(Ri)·(h′i−hi) (4.4)
Hence, based on Equations 4.3 and 4.4, the following equations could be respec-
tively obtained.
• RSigi−Sig′ii = AH1(PIDi)·(h
′
i−hi)
pub , g
ri·(Sigi−Sig′i) = ga·H1(PIDi)·(h
′
i−hi)
ri · (Sigi − Sig′i) = a ·H1(PIDi) · (h′i − hi) (4.5)
• RSigi·h′i−Sig′ihii = gH3(Ri)·(h′i−hi), gri(Sigi·h′i−Sig′ihi) = gH3(Ri)·(h′i−hi)
ri · (Sigi · h′i − Sig′i · hi) = H3(Ri) · (h′i − hi) (4.6)
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According to Equations 4.5 and 4.6, I outputs H3(Ri) ·H1(PIDi)−1(Sigi − Sig′i) ·
(Sigi·h′i−Sig′i·hi)−1 as the result of the DL problem. However, this is a contradiction
with the hardness of the DL problem in G. Consequently, this completes the proof.
4.3.3 Security and Attributes Analysis
Identity Privacy Preservation: In the enrollment stage, the vehicle’s genuine iden-
tity is concealed in the PID∗i = {PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z} by TA, where
PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub) and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}. To reveal the real iden-
tity IDi from PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub), A needs to compute PKbi,l = gki,l·b
based on PKi,l = gki,l and Bpub = gb. This, however, contradicts the hardness
of CDH problem. Thus, the CPS-CPPA solution for VANETs preserves identity
privacy.
Message Authentication and Integrity: Upon receiving Msgs =
{Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} from Vi, the verifier (one nearby RSU or ve-
hicle) verifies the correctness of RSigii · AH1(PIDi,l)·hipub = gH3(Ri) in order to check the
message’s validity and integrity. Based on Theorem 1 in Section 4.3.2, there is
no polynomial-time adversary A that could fabricate a legal message when the
DL problem is hard. Thus, A cannot obtain the master private key of TA and
generates legitimate information for message authentication and integrity.
Traceability: In the pseudo-identity generation and private key extrac-
tion stage, the vehicle’s genuine identity is in the pseudo-IDs PID∗i =
{PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z}, where PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub) and l ∈
{1, 2, · · · , z}. By knowing the master secret key b of the VANETs system, TA
could extract the real identity IDi = PIDi,l ⊕H0(PKbi,l, Bpub). Consequently, the
function of traceability is provided by the proposed CPS-CPPA solution.
Unlinkability: TA selects a group of private random numbers {ki,1, ki,2, · · · , ki,z} ∈
Z∗q in the enrollment stage and the vehicle also chooses random ri ∈ Z∗q in the
message signing stage, where PID∗i = {PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z}, PIDi,l =
IDi ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub), SK∗i = {ski,1, ski,2, · · · , ski,z}, Ri = gri , hi = H2(Mi,
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PIDi, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q , Sigi = (H3(Ri) − ski,l · hi) · r−1i . Due to the random-
ness of ki,1 and ri, the vehicle could generate random identities and signatures
from which the adversary cannot find the connection between two anonymous
identities or two signatures (i.e. not able to determine whether they are sent by
the same vehicle). Thus, our CPS-CPPA solution achieves unlinkability.
Resilient to Message Modification Attack: Each vehicle user broadcasts an
anonymous signature message to nearby RSUs and other vehicles in the format
Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}. A has the capability to change the content
of Mi after eavesdropping on the wireless medium. To protect the integrity of the
message, a vehicle’s signature on Mi is generated as Sigi = (H3(Ri)− ski,l ·hi) · r−1i ,
where Ti is the current timestamp and Ri = gri , hi = H2(Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti) ∈
Z∗q . Since the private key SKi is only known by the particular vehicle, no attacker
can generate a valid signature. Besides, the private key SKi is changed periodically.
Thus, the presented CPS-CPPA solution for VANETs is secure against message
modification attack.
Resilient to Impersonation Attack: To execute an impersonation attack, A has
to be able to generate valid Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}, where RSigii ·
A
H1(PIDi,l)·hi
pub = g
H3(Ri). Based on Theorem 1, A cannot fabricate such a signature
message. RSUs and other vehicles can check the legality of messages through
verifying the correctness of the aforementioned equation. Thus, the proposed
CPS-CPPA solution for VANETs could resist the impersonation attack.
Resilient to Replay Attack: Timestamp Ti is included in the signature message
Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} and is also included in the generation of
Sigi. Thus, the verifier could detect a replay attack when Ti is no longer fresh.
Thus, the proposed CPS-CPPA solution for VANETs is replay attack resilience.
Full Batch Verification: According to the function of batch verification
in Section 4.2.1, upon receiving n messages {M1, P ID1,l, PK1,l, R1, T1, Sig1},
{M2, P ID2,l, PK2,l, R2, T2, Sig2}, · · · , {Mn, P IDn,l, PKn,l, Rn, Tn, Sign} from differ-
ent vehicles during the same time interval, RSUs could verify their legitimacy
simultaneously.
No Map-to-Point Operation: It is expensive and complicated to execute the
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map-to-point operation, and map-to-point operation is avoided in the CPS-CPPA
scheme for VANETs.
No Certificate Management: In the CPS-CPPA solution for vehicle, neither ve-
hicle nor RSUs store any certificates for message verification. The vehicle only
needs to memorize the system parameters Params and {PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i }, where
PID∗i = {PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z}, PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub), SK∗i =
{ski,1, ski,2, · · · , ski,z}, ski,l = a · H1(PIDi,l), PK∗i = {PKi,1, PKi,2, · · · , PKi,z},
PKi,l = g
ki,l , and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z} generated by the TA. Therefore, TA does not
need to manage any certificate.
No Verifier Table: The adversary is not capable of stealing any verifier table since
there is no verifier table maintained by RSUs or vehicles. Therefore, the presented
CPS-CPPA solution for VANETs is stolen verifier table attack resilience.
Provable Security: The security proof of the cryptographic scheme is widely
adopted by cryptography protocols, so that the customers (e.g. individuals, com-
panies and governments etc.) would believe the security of the cryptographic
system. Therefore, the presented CPS-CPPA scheme is proved securely under a
security model.
4.4 Overheads Analysis
The overheads analysis on the CPS-CPPA protocol will be done in chapter 6 with
the ECPS-CPPA together.
4.5 Summary
VANETs will be increasingly popular and potentially be more interconnected with
our fabrics of society. For example, in the future, sensors on vehicles may be
used to collect our body data that can be linked to healthcare and other relevant
industries in order to deliver appropriate services. Security and privacy will
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remain two of several key research topics in such applications, at least in the
foreseeable future.
In this chapter, it presented an efficient and anonymous CPPA scheme based on
the TPD, which can be utilized in safety-related VANETs applications. It then
proved the security of the proposed solution. However, there is a weakness in the
CPS-CPPA protocol, which would be discussed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
ECPS-CPPA: Enhanced, Certificate-
less and Provably-Secure Conditional
Privacy-Preserving Authentication
Protocol
5.1 Motivation
In chapter 4, the CPS-CPPA attempts to resolve the weaknesses in the existing
CPPA protocols, especially those weaknesses in Azees et al.’s protocol [20] and
Zhang et al. ’s protocol [26]. The CPS-CPPA protocol provides properties suc-
cessfully, such as the message authentication and integrity, identity-preserving
protection, traceability, un-linkability and batch verification. But this chapter in
Section 5.2 will point out that the CPS-CPPA cannot guarantee the security of
master key a in practice, and not resist modification forged message attack as well
as impersonation attack.
To improve the CPS-CPPA protocol further, this chapter in Section 5.3 presents
an ECPS-CPPA protocol to be used in vehicular environments that supports both
privacy and security requirements in the VANETs system, and in Section 5.4
we also demonstrate that our ECPS-CPPA protocols secure against modification
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attack, impersonation attack, and other existing attacks and is certificateless.
5.2 Security Analysis of CPS-CPPA Protocol
In this section, we will propose three vulnerabilities against our CPS-CPPA solu-
tion, which are presented as below.
5.2.1 Leakage of Master Secret Key
Assuming the adversaryA has registered a vehicle in TA with {PID∗A, SK∗A, PK∗A}
stored in its TPD, where PID∗A = {PIDA,l = IDA ⊕ H0(PKbA,l, Bpub), l ∈
{1, · · · , z}}, SK∗A = {skA,l = a ·H1(PIDA,l), l ∈ {1, · · · , z}} and PK∗A = {PKA,l =
gkA,l , l ∈ {1, · · · , z}}. Although the storage device is assumed to be unassailable,
a highly motivated adversary can extract the information {PID∗A, SK∗A, PK∗A}
stored in the device by power analysis techniques [44].
According to {PIDA,l, skA,l, PKA,l} and skA,l = a ·H1(PIDA,l), the master key is
calculated as a = skA,l ·H1(PIDA,l)−1. And then the malicious adversaryAmount
other attacks such as forged message attack and impersonation attack as follows.
5.2.2 Forged Message Attack
The attacker A can transmit a forged message by the following steps.
1. A generates three random numbers rA ∈ Z∗q , PIDA ∈ Z∗q , PKA, and com-
putes RA = grA and secret key skA = a ·H1(PIDA) mod q.
2. A computes hA = H2(MA, P IDA, PKA, RA, TA) ∈ Z∗q , and SigA = (H3(RA)−
skA · hA) · r−1A mod q, where MA is a message upon traffic status and TA is the
current time-stamp. Then, the vehicle broadcasts {MA, P IDA, TA, RA, SigA}
to nearby RSUs and vehicles.
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3. After receiving {MA, P IDA, TA, RA, cA} from A, the verifier checks the fresh-
ness of TA, apparently, it is easy to produce fresh time-stamp.
4. The verifier computes H1(PIDA), hA = H2(MA, P IDA, PKA, RA, TA) ∈ Z∗q
and accepts the message because the equation RSigAA · AH1(PIDA)·hApub = gH3(RA)
holds. It is easy to verify as following steps. Due toRA = grA , Apub = ga,
skA = a ·H1(PIDA) mod q, SigA = (H3(RA)− skA ·hA) · r−1A mod q, we could
get that
RSigAA · AH1(PIDA)·hApub
= (grA)(H3(RA)−skA·hA)·r
−1
A · (ga)H1(PIDA)·hA
= g(H3(RA)−skA·hA) · (ga)H1(PIDA)·hA
= g(H3(RA)−a·H1(PIDA)·hA) · (ga)H1(PIDA)·hA
= g(H3(RA)−a·H1(PIDA)·hA)+a·H1(PIDA)·hA
= gH3(RA)
5.2.3 Impersonation Attack
A can forge a message with one intercepted user’s pseudo-identity PIDi,l through
the following steps.
1. A intercepts the transmitted messageMsgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}
sent from vehicle Vi.
2. A uses {PIDi,l, PKi,l}, to replace his/her {PIDA, PKA}.
3. A executes the other steps as those in 5.2.2.
4. If the TA later finds out that MA is a fake message, it will recover the identity
IDi by computing IDi = PIDi,l ⊕ H0(PKbi,l, Bpub) as the genuine identity
for the fake message, although VA is the genuine signer for that. Hence, the
adversary A could mount the framing attack on the honest Vi.
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5.3 The ECPS-CPPA Protocol
To overcome the vulnerabilities analyzed in the previous subsection 5.2, we re-
design an ECPS-CPPA solution for VANETs based on CPS-CPPA [27] in this sec-
tion. The ECPS-CPPA protocol also consists of two parts, namely: an anonymous
ECPS-CPPA solution for vehicle and an ID-based ECPS-CPPA solution for RSU.
5.3.1 ECPS-CPPA Protocol for Vehicle
The details of ECPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle are described as below, and the
working flow is also illustrated in Table 5.1.
System Parameters Setup: TA generates the system parameters Params as fol-
lows:
1. Depending on the security parameter k ∈ Z+, TA generates a prime q and a
group G of the order q, where g is a generator of G. TA also chooses three
cryptographic hash functions H0 : G× G → {0, 1}∗, H1 : G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q ,
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ ×G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q .
2. TA picks a random number a ∈ Z∗q and sets Apub = ga, where a is a master
secret key for private key extraction and is only known to TA.
3. TA chooses a random number b ∈ Z∗q and sets Bpub = gb, where b is a master
secret key for traceability and is only known to TA.
4. TA publishes system parameters Params = {q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2}.
Enrollment for Vehicle:
1. The vehicle Vi transmits his/her identity IDi including the owner’s per-
sonal information and the vehicle’s information to TA. Upon confirm-
ing the validity of IDi, TA selects a group of private random numbers
{ki,1, ki,2, · · · , ki,z} ∈ Z∗q and computes the corresponding public values
PK∗i = {PKi,1, PKi,2, · · · , PKi,z}, where PKi,l = gki,l and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
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Table 5.1: The working flow of ECPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle
Stages TA Vehicle Vi RSUj
System TA selects two master keys a, b ∈ Z∗q
Initialization TA computes Apub = ga and Bpub = gb as public keys
TA generates and broadcasts system parameters
Params = {q,G, g,Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3}
Vehicle
Enrollment
TA
{IDi}, offline←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Vi
TA selects random numbers {ki,1, · · · , ki,z} ∈ Z∗q
TA computes PKi,l = gki,l , l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes PIDi,l = IDi ⊕H0(Bki,1pub , PKi,l), l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes ski,l = a ·H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l) + ki,l, l ∈ {1, · · · , z}.
TA
{Params,PID∗i ,SK∗i ,PK∗i }, offline−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Vi
Vi stores {Params, PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i } into its TPD
Signature Vi selects PIDi,l, ski,l, PKi,l
Generation Vi randomly chooses ri ∈ Z∗q
Vi computes Ri = gri
Vi generates the current timestamp Ti
Vi computes hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q
Vi generates the signature Sigi = (ri − ski,l · hi)
Vi
Msgs={Mi,PIDi,l,PKi,l,Ri,Ti,Sigi}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
Single RSUj checks whether Ti is fresh
Authentication RSUj computes H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l)
RSUj computes hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q
RSUj checks if gSigi ·AH1(PKi,l,PIDi,l)·hipub · PKhii,l = Ri holds
Batch Vehicles
Msgs1,Msgs2,··· ,Msgsn−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
Authentication RSUj checks whether {T1, T2, · · · , Tn} are fresh
RSUj computes H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l) for i = 1, · · · , n
RSUj computes hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , n
RSUj checks if g
∑n
i=1(%i·Sigi) ·A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PKi,l,PIDi,l)·hi)
pub ·
∏n
i=1 PK
(%i·hi)
i,l =?
∏n
i=1R
%i
i
Traceability TA receives reported Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}
TA computes IDi = PIDi,l ⊕H1(PKbi,l, PKi,l)
2. TA generates a group of pseudo-IDs for Vi as PID∗i =
{PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z}, where PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H0(Bki,1pub , PKi,l)
and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}. Hence, the real identity IDi of vehicle Vi is concealed
in the pseudo-IDs PID∗i .
3. After computing the PID∗i , TA computes private keys SK∗i =
{ski,1, ski,2, · · · , ski,z}, where ski,l = a · H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l) + ki,l and l ∈
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{1, 2, · · · , z}.
4. TA sends system parameters Params and z triple sets of {PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i }
to vehicle Vi via a secure channel delivering a TPD for Vi. We assume that
every vehicle has installed an intrusion detection system which will alarm
the vehicle’s owner when the adversary A is trying to intrude the vehicle’s
TPD. We also assume that the adversaryA can extract the information inside
the TPD of the vehicle registered by A.
Vehicle Message Signing: The signature on one traffic-related message Mi by Vi
is explained as below.
1. Vi randomly picks a triple of (PIDi,l, ski,l, PKi,l) from the sets
(PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i ) separately. Then, Vi selects a random ri ∈ Z∗q and cal-
culates Ri = gri , hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q , Sigi = (ri − ski,l · hi), wherethe
generation of Sigi is based on [51], and Ti is the current timestamp.
2. Then, Vi issues the signature messageMsgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}
to a nearby RSU or other vehicles.
Single Message Verification: Once the receiver has received a single message
signed by Vi, it will verify the message as follows.
1. After receiving Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} signed by Vi, the re-
ceiver checks the freshness of timestamp Ti. The verifier drops the message
if it is not fresh.
2. If Ti is valid, the receiver then computes H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l), hi =
H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q and verifies whether gSigi · AH1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hipub · PKhii,l = Ri.
If the equation is satisfied, then the receiver accepts the validity of the mes-
sage Mi; otherwise, the receiver drops it.
Batch Messages Verification: Upon receiving n messages
{M1, P ID1,l, PK1,l, R1, T1, Sig1}, {M2, P ID2,l, PK2,l, R2, T2, Sig2}, · · · ,
{Mn, P IDn,l, PKn,l, Rn, Tn, Sign} simultaneously, the receiver uses Params =
{q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2} to authenticate batch messages, as follows.
1. The receiver checks the freshness of {T1, T2, · · · , Tn}, and drops the messages
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that are not fresh.
2. The receiver randomly selects n numbers {%1, %2, · · · , %n}, where %i ∈R [1, 2m]
for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and m = 80 is typically adequate [48, 59, 60].
3. The receiver computes H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l), hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n} and checks whether the below verification equation holds.
g
∑n
i=1(%i·Sigi) · A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi)
pub ·
n∏
i=1
PK
(%i·hi)
i,l =
n∏
i=1
R%ii
If it is equal, then the receiver accepts the messages; otherwise, the receiver
rejects the messages.
The correctness of the batch messages verification is demonstrated as follows:
g
∑n
i=1(%i·Sigi) · A
∑n
i=1(%i·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi)
pub ·
∏n
i=1 PK
(%i·hi)
i,l
=
∏n
i=1(g
(%i·Sigi) · A(%i·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi)pub · PK(%i·hi)i,l )
=
∏n
i=1(g
(%i·(ri−ski,l·hi)) · (ga)(%i·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi) · (gki,l)(%i·hi))
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·(ri−ski,l·hi+a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi+ki,l·hi)
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·(ri−(a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)+ki,l)·hi+a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi+ki,l·hi)
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·(ri−(a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)+ki,l)·hi+a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi+ki,l·hi)
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·(ri−a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi−ki,l·hi+a·H1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hi+ki,l·hi)
=
∏n
i=1 g
%i·(ri)
=
∏n
i=1R
%i
i
5.3.2 ECPS-CPPA Protocol for RSU
The details of the ECPS-CPPA protocol for the RSU are shown as follows (see also
Table 5.2), where this subsection omits the system setup stage since it is already
depicted in 5.3.1.
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Table 5.2: The working flow of ECPS-CPPA protocol for RSU
Stages TA Vehicle Vi RSUj
RSU
Enrollment
TA
{IDrsuj }, offline←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RSUj
TA selects random numbers {xj,1, · · · , xj,z} ∈ Z∗q
TA computes Yj,l = gxj,l , l ∈ {1, · · · , z}
TA computes rskj,l = a ·H1(Yj,l, RIDj) + xj,l, l ∈ {1, · · · , z}.
TA
{Params,RIDj ,RSK∗j ,Y ∗j }, offline−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
RSUj stores {Params,RIDj , RSK∗j , Y ∗j } into its TPD
Signature RSUj selects rskj,l, Yj,l
Generation RSUj randomly chooses wj ∈ Z∗q
RSUj computes Wj = gwj
RSUj generates the current timestamp Tj
RSUj computes hj = H2(Mj ,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q
RSUj generates the signature Rsigj = (wj − rskj,l · hj)
Vi
Msgs={Mj ,RIDj ,Yj,l,Wj ,Tj ,Rsigj}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RSUj
Single Vi checks whether Tj is fresh
Authentication Vi computes H1(Yj,l, RIDj)
Vi computes hj = H2(Mj ,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q
Vi checks if gRsigj ·AH1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hjpub · Y hjj,l = Wj holds
Batch Vi
Msgs1,Msgs2,··· ,Msgst−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ RSUj
Authentication Vi checks whether {T1, T2, · · · , Tt} are fresh
Vi computes H1(Yj,l, RIDj) for i = 1, · · · , t
Vi computes hj = H2(Mj ,Wj , Tj) ∈ Z∗q for i = 1, · · · , t
Vi checks if g
∑n
j=1(ςj ·Rsigj) ·A
∑n
j=1(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj)
pub ·
∏n
j=1 Y
(ςj ·hj)
j,l =
∏n
j=1W
ςj
j
Enrollment for RSU: TA generates a unique identity RIDj for each RSU, and
computes the private key for RSU as follows.
1. For a given RSU’s identity RIDj , TA selects a group of private random
numbers {xj,1, xj,2, · · · , xj,z} ∈ Z∗q and computes the corresponding public
values Y ∗j = {Yj,1, Yj,2, · · · , Yj,z}, where Yj,l = gxj,l and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
2. TA computes private keys RSK∗j = {rskj,1, rskj,2, · · · , rskj,z}, where rskj,l =
a ·H1(Yj,l, RIDj) + xj,l and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}.
3. Finally, the TA sends Params and {RIDj, RSK∗j , Y ∗j } to RSU via a secure
channel. Then, RSU stores {RSK∗j , Y ∗j }with its corresponding identityRIDj
into its storage memory.
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RSU Message Signing: The signature on a traffic-related message Mj generated
by the RSU is as follows:
1. RSU chooses a private key rskj,l from the setRSK∗j , a corresponding Yj,l from
the set Y ∗j , a random wj ∈ Z∗q and computes Wj = gwj , hj = H2(Mj,Wj, Tj) ∈
Z∗q , and Rsigj = (wj − rskj,l · hj), whereby Tj is the current timestamp which
supports the freshness of a valid signed message.
2. Then, RSU broadcasts the signature message Msgs =
{Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj, Rsigj} to nearby vehicles.
Single Message Verification: Vi will have to verify the signed message from RSU
in order to ensure the legitimacy of RSU.
1. After receiving Msgs = {Mj, RIDj, Yj,l,Wj, Tj, Rsigj} signed by the RSU, Vi
checks the freshness of timestamp Tj and drops the message if Tj is not fresh.
2. If Tj is valid, then Vi computes hj = H2(Mj,Wj, Tj) ∈ Z∗q , H1(Yj,l, RIDj) and
verifies whether gRsigj ·AH1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hjpub · Y hjj,l = Wj . If the equation is satisfied,
then Vi accepts the validity of the message Mj ; otherwise, Vi rejects it.
Batch Messages Verification: After receiving t messages
{M1, RID1, Y1,l,W1, T1, Rsig1}, {M2, RID2, Y2,l,W2, T2, Rsig2}, · · · ,
{Mt, RIDt, Yt,l,Wt, Tt, Rsigt} simultaneously, the vehicle verifies them using the
following steps.
1. The vehicle checks the freshness of {T1, T2, · · · , Tt}, and rejects the messages
if some of them are not fresh.
2. The vehicle randomly selects t numbers {ς1, ς2, · · · , ςt}, where ςj ∈R [1, 2m]
for j = 1, 2, · · · , t and m = 80 is typically adequate [48, 59, 60].
3. The vehicle computes hj = H2(Mj,Wj, Tj) ∈ Z∗q , H1(Yj,l, RIDj) for j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , t} and checks whether the below verification equation holds.
g
∑n
j=1(ςj ·Rsigj) · A
∑n
j=1(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj)
pub ·
n∏
j=1
Y
(ςj ·hj)
j,l =
n∏
j=1
W
ςj
j
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If it is equal, then the vehicle accepts the messages; otherwise, the vehicle
rejects the messages.
The correctness of the batch messages verification is demonstrated, as fol-
lows.
g
∑n
j=1(ςj ·Rsigj) · A
∑n
j=1(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj)
pub ·
∏n
j=1 Y
(ςj ·hj)
j,l
=
∏n
j=1(g
(ςj ·Rsigj) · A(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj)pub · PK(ςj ·hj)i,l )
=
∏n
j=1(g
(ςj ·(ri−rskj,l·hj)) · (ga)(ςj ·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj) · (gxj,l)(ςj ·hj))
=
∏n
j=1 g
ςj ·(ri−rskj,l·hj+a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj+xj,l·hj)
=
∏n
j=1 g
ςj ·(ri−(a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)+xj,l)·hj+a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj+xj,l·hj)
=
∏n
j=1 g
ςj ·(ri−(a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)+xj,l)·hj+a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj+xj,l·hj)
=
∏n
j=1 g
ςj ·(ri−a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj−xj,l·hj+a·H1(Yj,l,RIDj)·hj+xj,l·hj)
=
∏n
j=1 g
ςj ·(ri)
=
∏n
j=1R
ςj
i
5.4 Security and Soundness Proofs
In this section, it will demonstrate that the ECPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle
achieves design goals outlined in subsection 2.2 of Chapter 2. We does not give
further analysis on the ECPS-CPPA protocol for RSU, since the process of proof
and analysis is similar to that of the ECPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle as follows.
5.4.1 Security Model
The security model for the ECPS-CPPA protocol is as same as that in subsection
4.3.1 of Chapter 4 [27].
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5.4.2 Provable Security
Let the function AdvECPS−CPPAΩ2,A denote the advantage ofA in breaking conditional
privacy-preserving authentication of the presented ECPS-CPPA solution Ω2.
Definition 2. The ECPS-CPPA solution Ω2 is chosen-identity and chosen-message secure,
if for any polynomial-time adversary A, the function AdvECPS−CPPAΩ2,A is negligible.
Based on Definition 2, the chosen-identity and chosen-message security of the
ECPS-CPPA solution using random oracles are proved.
Theorem 2. Assuming that the underlying DL problem is intractable, the ECPS-CPPA
solution for VANETs is secure in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume that a polynomial-time adversary A can fabricate a valid signature
message Msgs = {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} by a non-negligible advantage ε,
then the challenger I can resolve the DL problem with a non-negligible advantage
through executing the A as a subroutine. Let Apub = ga be an instance of the
DL problem, and the aim of the I is to compute a. First, I issues Params =
{q,G, g, Apub, Bpub, H0, H1, H2, H3} to A, and A performs random oracle queries
adaptively simulated by I as below.
H0 Oracle: I maintains a list LH0 in the form of {G,G, pi0}, which is empty initially.
When A issues a query {Θ, Bpub} to I, I checks whether the tuple {G,G, pi0} is in
the list LH0 . If so, I issues pi0 = H0(Θ, Bpub) to A, otherwise, I selects a random
nonce pi0 ∈ Zp, issues pi0 = H0(Θ, Bpub) to A and appends {G,G, pi0} to the list LH0 .
H1 Oracle: I maintains a list LH1 in the form of {G,PIDi, pi1}, which is empty
initially. When A issues a query Υ to I, I checks whether the tuple {G,PIDi, pi1}
is in the list LH1 . If so, I issues pi1 = H1(Υ) to A, otherwise, I selects a random
nonce pi1 ∈ Zp, issues pi1 = H1(Υ) to A and appends {G,PIDi, pi1} to the list LH1 .
H2 Oracle: I maintains a list LH2 in the form of {Mi, Ri, Ti, pi2}, which is empty
initially. When A issues a query {Mi, Ri, Ti} to I, I checks whether the tuple
{Mi, Ri, Ti, pi2} is in the list LH2 . If so, I issues pi2 = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) to A, otherwise,
I selects a random nonce pi2 ∈ Zp, issues pi2 = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) to A and appends
{Mi, Ri, Ti, pi2} to the list LH2 .
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GenerateVehicle Oracle: I maintains a list Lvehicle in the form of
{IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi} which is empty initially. Once A sends this query to
I, A checks whether the tuple {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi} is in the list Lvehicle. If so,
I returns PKi to A; otherwise I executes the steps as below.
1) If IDi = ID∗i , I selects three random numbers ki, pi0 and pi1, computes PKi =
gki and holds {PIDi, SKi}. I stores {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi}, {G,G, pi0} and
{G,PIDi, pi1} in the lists Lvehicle, LH0 and LH1 respectively. At last, I returns
PKi to A.
2) If IDi 6= ID∗i , I selects three random numbers ki, pi0 and pi1, computes PKi =
gki , PIDi = IDi ⊕ pi0, ski = a · pi1 + ki. I stores {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi},
{G,G, pi0} and {G,PIDi, pi1} in the lists Lvehicle, LH0 and LH1 respectively
and finally returns PKi to A.
CorruptVehicle Oracle: A inquiries {IDi, ki, P IDi, ski, PKi} from Lvehicle and,
I issues {PIDi, ski} to A.
Signature Oracle: Upon receiving A’s query with message Mi and pseudo-
identity PIDi, I selects two random numbers ri, pi2, pi3 and computes Ri = gri
and Sigi = (ri − ski · pi2). I stores {Mi, Ri, Ti, pi2} to the list LH2 , and returns the
signature message Msgs = {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to A.
Finally, A outputs a signature message {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to I with
PIDi. If PIDi 6= PID∗i , then I aborts the game. I checks whether the below
equation is correct.
gSigi · AH1(PKi,P IDi)·hipub · PKhii = Ri (5.1)
If it is not correct, then I interrupts the game. Based on the forking lemma in [61],
if the challenger repeats the procedure with a different selection H1, then A can
output another legitimate signature message {Mi, P IDi, PKi, Ri, Ti, Sig′i}with the
advantage ε′ ≥ 1
9
. Thus, the following equation is obtained:
gSig
′
i · AH1(PKi,P IDi)′·hipub · PKhii = Ri (5.2)
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According to the above two equations, the following equations are obtained:
gSigi−Sig
′
i = A
(H1(PKi,P IDi)
′−H1(PKi,P IDi))·hi
pub (5.3)
Sigi − Sig′i = a · (H1(PKi, P IDi)′ −H1(PKi, P IDi)) · hi (5.4)
According to Equations 5.4, I outputs (Sigi − Sig′i) · ((H1(PKi, P IDi)′ −
H1(PKi, P IDi)) · hi)−1 as the result of the DL problem. The advantage that I
solves the DL problem can be analyzed via the following events [27].
1) Epid denotes the event that PIDi and PID∗i are equal.
2) Eforge denotes the event that A can forge two legitimate signatures.
Let NH1 denotes the number of H1 oracle queries executed in the above experi-
ments. Thus, it can be got that Prob[Epid] = 1NH1 , Prob[Eforge|Epid] ≥
1
9
· ε and the
advantage that A can solve the DL problem is as blow.
Prob[Eforge ∧ Epid] = Prob[Eforge|Epid] · Prob[Epid]
=≥ 1
9
· ε · 1
NH1
=
ε
9NH1
.
Therefore I solves the DL problem with a non-negligible advantage ε
9NH1
due to
the non-negligible ε and bounded NH1 . However, this is a contradiction with the
hardness of the DL problem in G. Consequently, this completes the proof.
5.4.3 Security and Attributes Analysis
Identity Privacy Preservation: In the enrollment stage, the vehicle user’s identity
IDi is masked in the form of PIDi,l = IDi ⊕ H1(Bki,1pub , PKi,l) by the TA, where
PKi,l = g
ki,l generated by TA, and ki,1 is a random number chosen by TA. To reveal
the vehicle user’s identity IDi from PIDi, A needs to compute Bki,lpub = gb·ki,l based
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on PKi,l = gki,l and Bpub = gb. This, however, is contradictive with the hardness of
CDH problem. Thus, our ECPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs safeguards the user’s
identity privacy.
Message Authentication and Integrity: Upon receiving Msgs =
{Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} from ui, the receiver authenticates the equa-
tion gSigi · AH1(PKi,l,P IDi,l)·hipub · PKhii,l = Ri so as to inspect the message’s legitimacy.
According to Theorem 2 in Section 5.4.2, any polynomial-time attacker A cannot
counterfeit a legal signature upon traffic message because of the difficult DL
problem. Therefore, A is not capable of extracting the master key of TA and
generating valid signing for message verification.
Traceability: In the enrollment stage, the vehicle’s genuine identity is masked
in the pseudo-IDs PID∗i = {PIDi,1, P IDi,2, · · · , P IDi,z}, where PIDi,l = IDi ⊕
H1(B
ki,1
pub , PKi,l) and l ∈ {1, 2, · · · , z}. By knowing the master secret key b of the
VANETs system, TA could extract the real identity IDi = PIDi,l⊕H0(PKbi,l, PKi,l).
Consequently, the function of traceability is provided by the ECPS-CPPA solution.
Unlinkability: TA selects a group of private random numbers {ki,1, · · · , ki,z} ∈ Z∗q
in the enrollment stage and the vehicle also chooses random ri ∈ Z∗q in the
message signing stage, where PID∗i = {PIDi,1, · · · , P IDi,z}, PIDi,l = IDi ⊕
H1(B
ki,1
pub , PKi,l), SK
∗
i = {ski,1, · · · , ski,z}, Ri = gri , hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q ,
Sigi = (ri − ski,l · hi). Due to the randomness of ki,1 and ri, the vehicle could
generate random identities and signatures from which the adversary cannot find
the connection between two anonymous identities or two signatures (i.e. not
able to determine whether they are sent by the same vehicle). Therefore, the
ECPS-CPPA protocol achieves unlinkability.
Secerecy of Master Key: In the ECPS-CPPA protocol, the TPD does not store the
master key a directly. The secret key is generated as ski,l = a·H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l)+ki,l,
where the master key a is protected by the random selected number ki,l. Even
though the adversary A have maliciously extracted {ski,l, PKi,l, P IDi,l}, A cannot
compute a out since it is impossible to determine two variables in one equation.
Resilient to Message Modification Attack: Every TPD of vehicle broadcasts the
message tuple Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to nearby RSUs and other
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vehicles. A has the capability to change the content of Mi after eavesdropping on
the wireless medium. In order to protect the integrity of the message, a vehicle’s
signature onMi is generated as Sigi = (ri−ski,l·hi), where hi = H2(Mi, Ri, Ti) ∈ Z∗q .
Since the private key ski,l is only known by the particular vehicle, no attacker
can generate a valid signature. Besides, the private key is changed periodically.
Thus, the ECPS-CPPA solution for VANETs is secure against message modification
attacks.
Resilient to Impersonation Attack: To mount masquerading attacks, A is sup-
posed to produce legal Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi}. According to
Theorem 2,A cannot counterfeit a legal signature successfully. The receivers could
inspect the legitimacy of the received message by authenticating the equation in
5.3.1. Thus, the ECPS-CPPA solution for VANETs could resist the impersonation
attack.
Resilient to Replay Attack: Timestamp Ti is involved in the signature tuple
Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} and is also included in the generation
of signature Sigi. Therefore, the receiver could check the replay attack once Ti is
overtime. Therefore, the ECPS-CPPA protocolfor VANETs is able to resist replay
attack.
Full Batch Authentication: According as the batch authentication in Section 5.3.1,
upon receiving nmessagesMsgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} for i = 1, · · · , n,
from different vehicles simultaneously, the receivers are capable of authenticating
the validity at one time.
No Map-to-Point Operation: The expensive and complicated map-to-point oper-
ation is also avoided in the ECPS-CPPA scheme for VANETs.
No Certificate Management: In the ECPS-CPPA solution for vehicle, neither ve-
hicle nor RSUs store any certificates for message verification. The vehicle only
needs to memorize the system parameters Params and {PID∗i , SK∗i , PK∗i }, where
PIDi,l = IDi ⊕H1(Bki,1pub , PKi,l), ski,l = a ·H1(PKi,l, P IDi,l) + ki,l, PKi,l = gki,l for
l ∈ {1, · · · , z} generated by the TA. Therefore, TA does not need to manage any
certificate.
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No Verifier Table: The presented ECPS-CPPA solution for VANETs is stolen veri-
fier table attack resilience since there is no verifier table maintained by RSUs or
vehicles.
Provable Security: The ECPS-CPPA scheme is proved securely under the random
oracle model.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, the proposed CPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs is analyzed. We
have revealed previously unknown attacks against the CPS-CPPA protocol, and
more importantly identified design flaws in this protocol. Specifically, in the
CPS-CPPA protocol, the master key a is not practically protected, since the highly-
motivated adversary can easily compute the master key a, and then mount the
forged message attack and impersonation attack. To resolve these weaknesses,
we presented an enhanced CPPA protocol for safety-related VANETs applications
and then demonstrated the security of the ECPS-CPPA solution.
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Chapter 6
Overheads Evaluation
In this chapter, it analyzes the performance of the proposed two solutions as well
as those of [18, 20], in terms of computation and communication overheads.
6.1 Computation Overheads
Notations used are as follows:
1. eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 denotes a bilinear pairing.
2. Tbp denotes the run time required for a bilinear pairing operation eˆ(Uˆ , Vˆ ),
where Uˆ , Vˆ ∈ G1.
3. Tsm−bp denotes the runtime for a scale multiplication operation about the
bilinear pairing in G1.
4. Tpa−bp denotes the runtime for a point addition operation about the bilinear
pairing in G1.
5. Tsm−ecc denotes the runtime for a scale multiplication operation about the
Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) in an additive group G.
6. Tpa−ecc denotes the runtime for a point addition operation about the ECC in
an additive group G.
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7. Th denotes the time required for running a cryptographic hash function
operation.
For a fair evaluation, the same run time in He et al.’s evaluation [18] is used –
see Table 6.1. The above cryptographic operations are executed using MIRACL
[62].The hardware platform is an Intel I7-4770 processor with 3.40 GHz clock
frequency, 4 gigabytes memory and runs Windows 7 operating system [18].
Table 6.1: Run time of multiple cryptographic operations
Cryptographic
Operation
Running Time
(milliseconds)
Tbp 4.211 ms
Tsm−bp 1.709 ms
Tpa−bp 0.0071 ms
Tsm−ecc 0.442 ms
Tpa−ecc 0.0018 ms
Th 0.0001 ms
Let MSG, SV and BV signify the message signature generation, single authenti-
cation, and batch authentication, separately.
Table 6.2 presents a comparative summary for the computation costs. In addition,
Fig.6.1 visually illustrates the comparative results in MSG and SV stages and
Fig.6.2 particularly shows the wholly comparative results in BV stage.
Within the MSG stage of Azees et al.’s protocol [20], the OBU executes 4 scalar
multiplication operations about the bilinear pairing, 2 point addition operations
about the bilinear pairing and 2 cryptographic hash function operations. Therefore,
the runtime of this stage is 4Tsm−bp + 2Tpa−bp + 2Th ≈ 6.8504 milliseconds (ms).
Within the SV stage, the OBU executes 2 bilinear pairing operations, 5 scalar mul-
tiplication operations about the bilinear pairing, and 2 point addition operations
about the bilinear pairing. Therefore, the runtime of this stage is 2Tbp + 5Tsm−bp
+ 2Tpa−bp ≈ 16.9812 ms. Within the BV stage, the OBU executes (n + 1) bilinear
pairing operations, (5n) scalar multiplication operations about the bilinear pairing
and (2n) point addition operations about the bilinear pairing. Hence, the runtime
of this stage is (n + 1)Tbp + (5n)Tsm−bp + (2n)Tpa−bp ≈ 12.77 n + 4.211 ms.
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Table 6.2: Computation costs: a comparative summary (Unit: millisecond)
Protocols MSG Stage SV Stage BV Stage
He et al.’s
protocol [18]
3Tsm−ecc + 3Th
≈ 1.3263
3Tsm−ecc +
2Tpa−ecc + 2Th ≈
1.3298
(2n + 2)Tsm−ecc +
(2n)Tpa−ecc + (2n)Th ≈
0.8878 n + 0.884
Azees et al.’s
protocol [20]
4Tsm−bp +
2Tpa−bp + 2Th ≈
6.8504
2Tbp + 5Tsm−bp +
2Tpa−bp ≈
16.9812
(n + 1)Tbp + (5n)Tsm−bp
+ (2n)Tpa−bp ≈ 12.77 n
+ 4.211
CPS-CPPA
protocol
1Tsm−ecc + 2Th
≈ 0.4422
3Tsm−ecc +
1Tpa−ecc + 2Th ≈
1.328
(n+2)Tsm−ecc +
(n)Tpa−ecc + (2n)Th ≈
0.444 n + 0.884
ECPS-CPPA
protocol
1Tsm−ecc + 1Th
≈ 0.4421
3Tsm−ecc +
2Tpa−ecc + 2Th ≈
1.3298
(2n+2)Tsm−ecc +
(2n)Tpa−ecc + (2n)Th ≈
0.8878 n + 0.884
Within the MSG stage of our ECPS-CPPA protocol, the OBU executes 1 scalar
multiplication operation about the ECC, 1 cryptographic hash function operations.
Hence, the runtime of this stage is 1Tsm−ecc + 1Th ≈ 0.4421 ms. Within the SV
stage, the OBU executes 3 scalar multiplication operations about the ECC, 2 point
addition operations about the ECC and 2 cryptographic hash function operations.
Thus, the runtime of this stage is 3Tsm−ecc + 2Tpa−ecc + 2Th ≈ 1.3298 ms. Within
the BV stage, the OBU executes (2n+2) scalar multiplication operations about
the ECC, 2n point addition operations about the ECC and 2n cryptographic hash
function operations. Thus, the runtime of this stage is (2n+2)Tsm−ecc + (2n)Tpa−ecc
+ (2n)Th ≈ 0.8878 n + 0.884 ms. Thus, the computation overhead in the MSG, SV
and BV stages of out ECPS-CPPA are lower than those of Azees et al.’s protocol
(see Fig.6.1 and 6.2 detailly).
In a similar way, the computation overhead in the MSG stage of our ECPS-CPPA
protocol are more favorable than that of [18] (see Fig.6.1), and the computation
overheads in the SV and BV stages of our ECPS-CPPA protocol are equal to
those of [18] respectively (see Fig.6.1, Fig. 6.2 detailly). Although our CPS-CPPA
protocol owns the least computation overheads compared with our ECPS-CPPA
protocol, it has a weakness issue about the master key in practice.
61
Figure 6.1: Computation costs of MSG and SV stages
Figure 6.2: Computation costs of BV stage
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6.2 Communication Costs
This subsection will evaluate the communication costs. Let the sizes of the element
in G1, the element in G, the element in Z∗q , timestamp and the value of hash
function be 128 bytes, 40 bytes, 20 bytes, 4 bytes and 20 bytes, respectively [18].
The messages of traffic status are not considered in the communication comparison,
since they are similar in size. Table 6.3 gives a comparative summary.
Table 6.3: Communication costs: a comparative summary (Unit: byte)
Protocols Sending of
one message
Sending of
n messages
He et al.’s protocol [18] 124 124n
Azees et al.’s protocol [20] 848 848n
CPS-CPPA protocol 124 124n
ECPS-CPPA protocol 124 124n
In He et al.’s solution [18], the vehicle transmits its signature messages
{AIDi, Ti, Ri,Mi} to the verifier, where AIDi = {AIDi,1, AIDi,2}, AIDi,1 ∈ G,
AIDi,2 ∈ Zq, Ri ∈ G, σi ∈ Zq and Ti is a timestamp. Thus, the communi-
cation overhead is 2 × 40 + 2 × 20 + 4 = 124 bytes. In Azees et al.’s proto-
col [20], the vehicle transmits the signature tuple {sig||Yk||Certk} to the verifier,
where Certk = {Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}, {sig, Ei, DIDui , γu, γv, Yk} ∈
G1, {λ, σ1, σ2} ∈ Z∗q , c is a hash value. Thus, the communication cost is 6 × 128
+ 4 × 20 = 848 bytes. In our CPS-CPPA and ECPS-CPPA protocols, the vehicle
sends its signature tuple Msgs = {Mi, P IDi,l, PKi,l, Ri, Ti, Sigi} to the verifier,
where {PKi,l, Ri} ∈ G, ti is the timestamp, and {PIDi,l, Sigi} ∈ Z∗q . Thus, the
communication overhead is 2 × 40 + 2 × 20 + 4 = 124 bytes.
Therefore, our ECPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs owns a favorable communication
overhead, compared with other protocols [18, 20].
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6.3 Summary
In this chapter, we compared the proposed two CPPA protocols with the other two
existing CPPA protocols on the aspects of computation overhead and communi-
cation overhead. The results show that our ECPS-CPPA protocol owns favorable
computation and communication costs. In addition, our CPS-CPPA protocol owns
the least computation overheads compared with our ECPS-CPPA protocol, but
there is a weakness issue about the master key in practice.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
With the potential of VANETs in applications ranging from smart cities to smart
campuses to battlefields, and so on, designing efficient security and privacy so-
lutions for VANETs will be increasingly important. It is also important to study
the soundness of proposed solutions to ensure that we are able to identify any
vulnerabilities and limitations in these solutions prior to them being deployed in a
real-world setting.
In this thesis, we studied the existing CPPA protocol for VANETs in order to im-
prove the CPPA further. For example, we made the cryptanalysis on Azees et al.’s
CPPA protocol and Zhang et al.’s CPPA protocol respectively in Chapter 3, which
revealed previously unknown attacks (i.e. bogus message attack, framing attack,
Sybil attack, and replay attack) against protocols. Specifically, in Azees et al.’s
protocol, randomly-selected numbers are used to produce all other parameters
without binding these numbers to an identity. Besides, there is no reliable public
verification. Therefore, the highly-motivated adversary is easily capable of exploit-
ing the weaknesses to mount the four attacks we showed in chapter 3. In Zhang
et al.’s CPPA protocol, the RSU issues its secret key aj to vehicles with a simple
variation, which make the protocol not resilient with malicious attacks.
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To solve the flaws of existing CPPA protocols, especially, those in the protocols of
Azees et al. [20] and Zhang et al. [26]. Chapter 4 introduces a CPS-CPPA proto-
col for VANETs with the function of batch verification, which can be utilized in
safety-related VANETs applications. It then proved the security of the proposed
CPS-CPPA solution. However, we revealed previously unknown attacks against
our CPS-CPPA protocol for VANETs, and more importantly identified design
flaws in this protocol. Specifically, in the CPS-CPPA protocol, the master key a is
not practically safeguarded, where the malicious adversary can easily compute the
master key a from his/her registered vehicle’s TPD, and then make the modifica-
tion attack and impersonation attack successfully. To overcome these weaknesses,
Chapter 5 presents an ECPS-CPPA protocol for safety-related VANETs applica-
tions and demonstrated the security of the ECPS-CPPA version. In addition, we
compare the ECPS-CPPA protocol with the other two CPPA protocols on the
aspects of communication and computation overheads .
7.2 Future Work
Upon the CPPA protocols, there are still some remaining issues that needed to
be studied in the future. Firstly, in the ECPS-CPPA protocol, TA stores a limited
number (i.e. z) of parameter triples in the vehicle’s TPD, which means that the
number of PIDs are limited. That is, when a vehicle has used up the PIDs for a
long time, the driver has to apply new PIDs from TA. Otherwise, the vehicle is
vulnerable to the PID linking attack, since the vehicle has been using the PIDs
repetitively for a long time. So, is it possible to generate a random PID for every
signature, which should also be traced by TA? If it is not possible to design such a
CPPA protocol in principle, the efficient and secure PID changing strategies are
necessary. Secondly, TA keeps two master keys a and b, but it is impossible for all
the vehicles to register in one TA spot. So the management and transport of the
master keys are an crucial issue.
This paper is mainly about the theory design for VANET, which is the first and
fundamental step. In the future, the simulation before the real-world evaluation
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is very necessary. Then, a prototype of the presented solutions for real-world
evaluation is going to be implemented in order to re-define the presented protocols,
for example within a closed environment (e.g. within the campus grounds of the
authors’ institutions in Germany and U.S.).
67

Bibliography
[1] Hoa La Vinh and Ana Rosa Cavalli. Security attacks and solutions in vehicular
ad hoc networks: a survey. International journal on AdHoc networking systems
(IJANS), 4(2):1–20, 2014.
[2] Fengzhong Qu, Zhihui Wu, Fei-Yue Wang, and Woong Cho. A security
and privacy review of vanets. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation
Systems, 16(6):2985–2996, 2015.
[3] Kyung-Ah Shim. Cpas: An efficient conditional privacy-preserving authenti-
cation scheme for vehicular sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, 61(4):1874–1883, 2012.
[4] Shiang-Feng Tzeng, Shi-Jinn Horng, Tianrui Li, Xian Wang, Po-Hsian Huang,
and Muhammad Khurram Khan. Enhancing security and privacy for identity-
based batch verification scheme in vanets. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, 66(4):3235–3248, 2017.
[5] Tat Wing Chim, Siu-Ming Yiu, Lucas CK Hui, and Victor OK Li. Specs: Secure
and privacy enhancing communications schemes for vanets. Ad Hoc Networks,
9(2):189–203, 2011.
[6] Georgios Karagiannis, Onur Altintas, Eylem Ekici, Geert Heijenk, Boangoat
Jarupan, Kenneth Lin, and Timothy Weil. Vehicular networking: A survey and
tutorial on requirements, architectures, challenges, standards and solutions.
IEEE communications surveys & tutorials, 13(4):584–616, 2011.
[7] Frank Kargl, Panagiotis Papadimitratos, Levente Buttyan, Michael Müter,
69
Elmar Schoch, Bjorn Wiedersheim, Ta-Vinh Thong, Giorgio Calandriello,
Albert Held, Antonio Kung, et al. Secure vehicular communication systems:
implementation, performance, and research challenges. IEEE Communications
magazine, 46(11):110–118, 2008.
[8] Abdelwahab Boualouache, Sidi-Mohammed Senouci, and Samira Moussaoui.
A survey on pseudonym changing strategies for vehicular ad-hoc networks.
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 2017.
[9] Maxim Raya and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. Securing vehicular ad hoc networks.
Journal of computer security, 15(1):39–68, 2007.
[10] Mohammad Reza Jabbarpour, Houman Zarrabi, Rashid Hafeez Khokhar,
Shahaboddin Shamshirband, and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. Applications
of computational intelligence in vehicle traffic congestion problem: a survey.
Soft Computing, 22(7):2299–2320, 2018.
[11] Zhenyu Zhou, Caixia Gao, Chen Xu, Yan Zhang, Shahid Mumtaz, and
Jonathan Rodriguez. Social big-data-based content dissemination in internet
of vehicles. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 14(2):768–777, 2018.
[12] Kyung-Ah Shim. Reconstruction of a secure authentication scheme for vehic-
ular ad hoc networks using a binary authentication tree. IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, 12(11):5386–5393, 2013.
[13] Jun Song, Fan Yang, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Zhijian Zhuang, and Lizhe
Wang. Sipf: A secure installment payment framework for drive-thru internet.
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), 16(2):52, 2017.
[14] Sherali Zeadally, Ray Hunt, Yuh-Shyan Chen, Angela Irwin, and Aamir
Hassan. Vehicular ad hoc networks (vanets): status, results, and challenges.
Telecommunication Systems, 50(4):217–241, 2012.
[15] Daniel Jacobs, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, M-Tahar Kechadi, and Nhien-An
Le-Khac. Volkswagen car entertainment system forensics. In Trustcom/Big-
DataSE/ICESS, 2017 IEEE, pages 699–705. IEEE, 2017.
70
[16] Richard Gilles Engoulou, Martine Bellaïche, Samuel Pierre, and Alejandro
Quintero. Vanet security surveys. Computer Communications, 44:1–13, 2014.
[17] Jiafu Wan, Daqiang Zhang, Shengjie Zhao, Laurence Yang, and Jaime Lloret.
Context-aware vehicular cyber-physical systems with cloud support: architec-
ture, challenges, and solutions. IEEE Communications Magazine, 52(8):106–113,
2014.
[18] Debiao He, Sherali Zeadally, Baowen Xu, and Xinyi Huang. An efficient
identity-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for
vehicular ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, 10(12):2681–2691, 2015.
[19] Jun Shao, Xiaodong Lin, Rongxing Lu, and Cong Zuo. A threshold anony-
mous authentication protocol for vanets. IEEE Transactions on vehicular tech-
nology, 65(3):1711–1720, 2016.
[20] Maria Azees, Pandi Vijayakumar, and Lazarus Jegatha Deboarh. Eaap: effi-
cient anonymous authentication with conditional privacy-preserving scheme
for vehicular ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation
Systems, 18(9):2467–2476, 2017.
[21] Chandana Gamage, Ben Gras, Bruno Crispo, and Andrew S Tanenbaum. An
identity-based ring signature scheme with enhanced privacy. In SecureComm,
pages 1–5. Citeseer, 2006.
[22] Yixin Jiang, Minghui Shi, Xuemin Shen, and Chuang Lin. Bat: A robust
signature scheme for vehicular networks using binary authentication tree.
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 8(4):1974–1983, 2009.
[23] Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Haojin Zhu, P-H Ho, and Xuemin Shen. Ecpp:
Efficient conditional privacy preservation protocol for secure vehicular com-
munications. In INFOCOM 2008. The 27th Conference on Computer Communica-
tions. IEEE, pages 1229–1237. IEEE, 2008.
[24] Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Tom H Luan, Xiaohui Liang, and Xuemin Shen.
71
Pseudonym changing at social spots: An effective strategy for location privacy
in vanets. IEEE transactions on vehicular technology, 61(1):86–96, 2011.
[25] Chenxi Zhang, Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, P-H Ho, and Xuemin Shen.
An efficient identity-based batch verification scheme for vehicular sensor
networks. In INFOCOM 2008. The 27th Conference on Computer Communications.
IEEE, pages 246–250. IEEE, 2008.
[26] Lei Zhang, Qianhong Wu, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Bo Qin, and Chuanyan
Hu. Distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication in vanets. IEEE
Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 18(3):516–526, 2017.
[27] JiLiang Li, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, WeiGuo Zhang, Saru Kumari,
Joel JPC Rodrigues, Muhammad Khurram Khan, and Dieter Hogrefe. Epa-
cppa: An efficient, provably-secure and anonymous conditional privacy-
preserving authentication scheme for vehicular ad hoc networks. Vehicular
Communications, 13:104–113, 2018.
[28] Byungjin Ko, Haengju Lee, and Sang Hyuk Son. Gps-less localization system
in vehicular networks using dedicated short range communication. In Em-
bedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications (RTCSA), 2016 IEEE
22nd International Conference on, pages 106–106. IEEE, 2016.
[29] Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[30] Debiao He, Neeraj Kumar, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, and Wei Wu. Effi-
cient hierarchical identity-based signature with batch verification for auto-
matic dependent surveillance-broadcast system. IEEE Transactions on Informa-
tion Forensics and Security, 12(2):454–464, 2017.
[31] Ahren Studer, Fan Bai, Bhargav Bellur, and Adrian Perrig. Flexible, extensible,
and efficient vanet authentication. Journal of Communications and Networks,
11(6):574–588, 2009.
[32] Jonathan Petit, Florian Schaub, Michael Feiri, and Frank Kargl. Pseudonym
72
schemes in vehicular networks: A survey. IEEE communications surveys &
tutorials, 17(1):228–255, 2015.
[33] Brijesh Kumar Chaurasia and Shekhar Verma. Conditional privacy through
ring signature in vehicular ad-hoc networks. In Transactions on computational
science XIII, pages 147–156. Springer, 2011.
[34] Panagiotis Panos Papadimitratos, Ghita Mezzour, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux.
Certificate revocation list distribution in vehicular communication systems.
In Proceedings of the fifth ACM international workshop on VehiculAr Inter-
NETworking, pages 86–87. ACM, 2008.
[35] Björn Wiedersheim, Zhendong Ma, Frank Kargl, and Panos Papadimitratos.
Privacy in inter-vehicular networks: Why simple pseudonym change is not
enough. In Wireless On-demand Network Systems and Services (WONS), 2010
Seventh International Conference on, pages 176–183. IEEE, 2010.
[36] Abdelwahab Boualouache, Sidi-Mohammed Senouci, and Samira Moussaoui.
Vlpz: The vehicular location privacy zone. Procedia Computer Science, 83:369–
376, 2016.
[37] Abdelwahab Boualouache and Samira Moussaoui. Tapcs: Traffic-aware
pseudonym changing strategy for vanets. Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applica-
tions, 10(4):1008–1020, 2017.
[38] Xinxin Liu, Han Zhao, Miao Pan, Hao Yue, Xiaolin Li, and Yuguang Fang.
Traffic-aware multiple mix zone placement for protecting location privacy. In
INFOCOM, 2012 Proceedings IEEE, pages 972–980. IEEE, 2012.
[39] Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Tom H Luan, Xiaohui Liang, and Xuemin Shen.
Anonymity analysis on social spot based pseudonym changing for location
privacy in vanets. In Communications (ICC), 2011 IEEE International Conference
on, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2011.
[40] Yuanyuan Pan and Jianqing Li. Cooperative pseudonym change scheme
based on the number of neighbors in vanets. Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, 36(6):1599–1609, 2013.
73
[41] Hesiri Weerasinghe, Huirong Fu, Supeng Leng, and Ye Zhu. Enhancing un-
linkability in vehicular ad hoc networks. In Intelligence and Security Informatics
(ISI), 2011 IEEE International Conference on, pages 161–166. IEEE, 2011.
[42] JiLiang Li, WeiGuo Zhang, Saru Kumari, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, and
Dieter Hogrefe. Security analysis and improvement of a mutual authentica-
tion and key agreement solution for wireless sensor networks using chaotic
maps. Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies, 29(6):e3295,
2018.
[43] JiLiang Li, WeiGuo Zhang, Vivek Dabra, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Saru
Kumari, and Dieter Hogrefe. Aep-ppa: An anonymous, efficient and
provably-secure privacy-preserving authentication protocol for mobile ser-
vices in smart cities. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 134:52–61,
2019.
[44] Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun. Differential power analysis. In
Annual International Cryptology Conference, pages 388–397. Springer, 1999.
[45] David Galindo, Javier Herranz, and Eike Kiltz. On the generic construction of
identity-based signatures with additional properties. In International Confer-
ence on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, pages
178–193. Springer, 2006.
[46] Xiaodong Lin, Xiaoting Sun, Pin-Han Ho, and Xuemin Shen. Gsis: A se-
cure and privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular communications. IEEE
Transactions on vehicular technology, 56(6):3442–3456, 2007.
[47] Yusuke Nozaki, Yoshiya Ikezaki, and Masaya Yoshikawa. Tamper resistance
of iot devices against electromagnnetic analysis. In Future of Electron Devices,
Kansai (IMFEDK), 2016 IEEE International Meeting for, pages 1–2. IEEE, 2016.
[48] Joseph K Liu, Tsz Hon Yuen, Man Ho Au, and Willy Susilo. Improvements
on an authentication scheme for vehicular sensor networks. Expert Systems
with Applications, 41(5):2559–2564, 2014.
[49] Jung-Shian Li and Kun-Hsuan Liu. A lightweight identity authentication
74
protocol for vehicular networks. Telecommunication Systems, 53(4):425–438,
2013.
[50] Cheng-Chi Lee and Yan-Ming Lai. Toward a secure batch verification with
group testing for vanet. Wireless networks, 19(6):1441–1449, 2013.
[51] Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. Journal of
cryptology, 4(3):161–174, 1991.
[52] Tiziri Oulhaci, Mawloud Omar, Fatiha Harzine, and Ines Harfi. Secure and
distributed certification system architecture for safety message authentication
in vanet. Telecommunication Systems, 64(4):679–694, 2017.
[53] Cheng-Chi Lee, Yan-Ming Lai, and Pu-Jen Cheng. An efficient multiple
session key establishment scheme for vanet group integration. IEEE Intelligent
Systems, 31(6):35–43, 2016.
[54] Lei Zhang. Otibaagka: a new security tool for cryptographic mix-zone
establishment in vehicular ad hoc networks. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 12(12):2998–3010, 2017.
[55] Maryam Rajabzadeh Asaar, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, Willy Susilo, and Akbar
Majidi. A secure and efficient authentication technique for vehicular ad-hoc
networks. IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, 67(6):5409–5423, 2018.
[56] Neetesh Saxena, Hong Shen, Nikos Komninos, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo,
and Narendra S Chaudhari. Bvpsms: A batch verification protocol for end-to-
end secure sms for mobile users. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 2018.
[57] Eike Kiltz and Krzysztof Pietrzak. Leakage resilient elgamal encryption. In In-
ternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information
Security, pages 595–612. Springer, 2010.
[58] Taher ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based
on discrete logarithms. IEEE transactions on information theory, 31(4):469–472,
1985.
[59] Shi-Jinn Horng, Shiang-Feng Tzeng, Yi Pan, Pingzhi Fan, Xian Wang, Tianrui
75
Li, and Muhammad Khurram Khan. b-specs+: Batch verification for secure
pseudonymous authentication in vanet. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 8(11):1860–1875, 2013.
[60] Zhang Jianhong, Xu Min, and Liu Liying. On the security of a secure batch
verification with group testing for vanet. International Journal of Network
Security, 16(5):351–358, 2014.
[61] David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern. Security arguments for digital signa-
tures and blind signatures. Journal of cryptology, 13(3):361–396, 2000.
[62] Shamus Software Ltd. [online]. available:
http://www.shamus.ie/index.php?page=home, accessed may 1, 2015., 2005.
76
Acronyms
CPPA Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CPS-CPPA Certificateless and Provably-Secure Conditional Privacy-Preserving
Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
ECPS-CPPA Enhanced, Certificateless and Provably-Secure Conditional
Privacy-Preserving Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
RSU Roadside Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
VANETs Vehicular Ad hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
VANET Vehicular Ad hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
RSUs Roadside Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
MANETs Mobile Ad hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
MANET Mobile Ad hoc Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
TAs Trusted Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
IoV Internet of Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
OBUs Onboard Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
V2V Vehicle-to-Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
V2I Vehicle-to-Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
OBU Onboard Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ITS Intelligent Transport Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
TA Trusted Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ID Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
TPD Tamper-Proof Device. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
DL Discrete Logarithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CDH Computational Diffie-Hellman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
77
PKI Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
PID Pseudo-Identity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
PIDs Pseudo-Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ECC Elliptic-Curve Cryptography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
78
List of Figures
1.1 A typical structure of VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 The network model of VANETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1 Computation costs of MSG and SV stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2 Computation costs of BV stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
79

List of Tables
4.1 The working flow of anonymous CPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle . . 28
4.2 The working flow of ID-based CPS-CPPA protocol for RSU . . . . . 32
5.1 The working flow of ECPS-CPPA protocol for vehicle . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 The working flow of ECPS-CPPA protocol for RSU . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1 Run time of multiple cryptographic operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2 Computation costs: a comparative summary (Unit: millisecond) . . 61
6.3 Communication costs: a comparative summary (Unit: byte) . . . . 63
81

